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This article explains how the structure of U.S. health-care data protection
(specifically its sectoral and downstream properties) has led to a chronically
uneven policy environment for different types of health-care data. It examines
claims for health-care data protection exceptionalism and competing demands
such as data liquidity. In conclusion, the article takes the position that health-
care-data exceptionalism remains a valid imperative and that even current
concerns about data liquidity can be accommodated in an exceptional protective
model. However, re-calibrating our protection of health-care data residing
outside of the traditional health-care domain is challenging, currently even
politically impossible. Notwithstanding, a hybrid model is envisioned with
downstream HIPAA model remaining the dominant force within the health-care
domain, but being supplemented by targeted upstream and point-of-use
protections applying to health-care data in disrupted spaces.
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"Your previous provider refused to share your electronic medical records,
but not to worry-I was able to obtain all of your information online."i
INTRODUCTION
In 1994, two years before passage of the statute that authorized the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) privacy and
security rules, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) took the position that "legislation
should clearly establish that the confidentiality of person-identifiable data is an
attribute afforded to the data elements themselves, regardless of who holds the
data."2 That exhortation was ignored, allowing a regulatory vector between the
protection of health-care data held inside and outside of the conventional health
care space. Policymakers' persistent, systemic failure to safeguard health-care
data outside the HIPAA domain is now exemplified by the minimal, sub-HIPAA
data protection afforded health-care data either held by data brokers ("companies
that collect consumers' personal information and resell or share that information
with others"3) or created by mobile apps.
The result of this policy misstep is an emerging narrative of regulatory
disruption and arbitrage. Simply put, disruption and arbitrage can occur when
disruptive businesses in a lightly regulated domain create products previously
associated with incumbents of a highly regulated domain.
This is not just another story of emerging technologies exposing the
lamentable state of data protection in the United States. It is also an account of
the likely depreciation of a health-care-specific policy position that was hard won
and as yet has not been convincingly refuted. This policy is health-care privacy
exceptionalism. As described below, the fundamental flaw in U.S. data protection
was the rejection of generalized or universal protection in favor of a domain-
specific model. Virtually alone among those domains, health care carved out a
reasonably effective data protection position, referred to as health-care privacy
exceptionalism, courtesy of the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules4 and their
1. Kaamran Hafeez, Daily Cartoon, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 11, 2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/cartoons/daily-cartoon/daily-cartoon-friday-september-11th-healthcare-
doctor-visit [https://perma.cc/K3N6-6BW4].
2. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, HEALTH DATA IN THE INFORMATION AGE: USE, DISCLOSURE, AND
PRIVACY 191 (Molla S. Donaldson & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1994) [hereinafter HEALTH DATA IN
THE INFORMATION AGE].
3. Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability, FED. TRADE COMMISSION i
(2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-
accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M9M5-A6P8] [hereinafter Data Brokers].
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state law analogues.' Exceptionalism also has a downside. Conversations about
mainstream data protection have tended to ignore, even isolate health care,
viewing the domain as sui generis and adequately protected by HIPAA.
The key to understanding current disruption and arbitrage in the health-care
data sector is an appreciation of the U.S. data protection approach and, obviously,
its particular application to health care. While the sectoral nature of U.S. health-
care data protections is generally understood, other properties, such as the
distinction between upstream and downstream data protection models, may not
be so well-known. The intersections of multiple data protection models help
explain the current declining state of health-care data protection. Equally,
understanding multiple models is helpful in refuting over-simplified binaries (for
example, privacy versus data liquidity) and provides insight into potential data
protection reforms.
The analysis that follows suggests two examples of regulatory disruption and
arbitrage in in health-care data. The first example considers health-care data
collected, analyzed, and sold by big data brokers. Some of those data are created
within the highly regulated space of health-care practice but legally "exported"
(for example, they may have been de-identified). Other big data are created
outside the highly regulated health-care domain but are medically inflected, and,
once combined with other data points, operate as data proxies for protected
HIPAA data. In both scenarios, data triangulation may defeat any de-
identification. In the second example, users increasingly generate wellness,
fitness, and sickness data on mobile health platforms or by mobile health apps.
Again, the picture is complicated (hence the disruption). Some data are created in
a highly regulated space but then exported to a mobile device; other data are
processed in the opposite direction.
This article takes the position that health-care-data exceptionalism remains a
valid imperative and that even current concerns about data liquidity can be
accommodated in an exceptional protective model. However, re-calibrating our
protection of health-care data residing outside of the traditional health-care
domain is challenging. This article envisions a hybrid model, with downstream
HIPAA model remaining the dominant force within the health-care domain,
supplemented by upstream and point-of-use protections applying to health-care
data in disrupted spaces.
(Unofficial Version, as amended through March 26, 2013), U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & Hum. SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/combined/hipaa-
simplification-201303.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9R8-QH7A].
5. See generally Joy L. Pritts, Altered States: State Health Privacy Laws and the Impact of
the Federal Health Privacy Rule, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICs 327, 332-40 (2002).
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I. BACKGROUND: KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S. DATA PROTECTION
The dysfunctional nature of U.S. data protection is ironic given its often-
heralded roots. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis's famous Harvard article' has
achieved mythic fame for birthing its eponymous "Right to Privacy." However,
looking back at their article today, it is striking to see the relatively narrow driver
that led those famous lawyers to propose the recognition of the "right to be let
alone."' Primarily, they seemed concerned about some members of the press
(perhaps, in today's terms, the paparazzi) and what the authors viewed as an
inappropriate appetite for gossip and triviality.' Indeed, Jill Lepore has described
the article, "a manifesto against the publicity of modernity."' Today, the article's
"Right to Privacy" title plays better than its substance and, perversely, that title
now exists merely as a slogan inaccurately preserving the myth of strong U.S.
data protection. Those seeking the source of the contemporary data protection
debate are more likely to find it, albeit accompanied by dystopian contexts, in
Alan Westin's 1967 book Privacy and Freedom"o or his 1972 preview of today's
data broker issues, Databanks in a Free Society."
With no little irony given the health-care context of this paper, it was the
U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), a precursor to the
Department of Health & Human Services (HHS), which first considered a
comprehensive privacy law applying across all domains and regulating both
public and private entities.12 The HEW report discussed both government and
non-governmental information practices13 and outlined one of the first iterations
of Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs).14 FTPPs are a distillation of the
best information practices common to developed democracies and, as noted by
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), include some core privacy principles: (1)
Notice/Awareness; (2) Choice/Consent; (3) Access/Participation; (4)
Integrity/Security; and (5) Enforcement/Redress."'
6. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv. 193
(1890).
7. Id. at 195.
8. Id. at 196.
9. Jill Lepore, The Prism: Privacy in an Age of Publicity, NEW YORKER (June 24, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/06/24/130624fafact lepore [https://perma.cc/5AN6-
EAH5].
10. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967).
11. ALAN F. WESTIN, MICHAEL A. BAKER, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY: COMPUTERS,
RECORD-KEEPING, AND PRIVACY (1972).
12. SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMM., U.S. DEP'T. HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, DHEW PUB. No.
(OS) 73-94, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973),
http://www.justice.gov/opel/docs/rec-com-rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZU4D-DGC9].
13. Id. at 33-46.
14. Id. at xx-xxi, xxiii.
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Unfortunately, the misstep that followed was that the HEW report only
recommended, and Congress only enacted, privacy legislation to control the data
collecting practices of the federal government. Many of the issues discussed in
this article can be traced back to this Pyrrhic victory, the Privacy Act of 1974.16
What Frank Pasquale has termed U.S. privacy law's "original sin" was the failure
to embrace a comprehensive rather than piecemeal approach to data protection. 17
A. Sectoral Data Protection
Thereafter, as acknowledged by the 2012 White House report, "most Federal
data privacy statutes appl[ied] only to specific sectors, such as healthcare,
education, communications, and financial services or, in the case of online data
collection, to children." The original sin is not just about preferring sectoral to
more comprehensive regulation. The patchwork of resulting protections "results
from the sectoral approach having been created backwards. Rather than coming
up with an overall picture and then breaking it up into smaller pieces that mesh
together, Congress has been sporadically creating individual pieces of ad hoc
legislation."" Thus, the "sectoral approach is emblematic of the lack of a
perceptible, cohesive commercial data privacy policy, which creates complexity
and costs for businesses and confuses consumers."
20
The sectoral approach has played out over multiple industries. As is well
known, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) governs consumer privacy in the
financial sector.21 GLBA, like HIPAA, is sectoral, applying to narrowly defined
data custodians, specifically groups of financial entities. Just as HIPAA does not
apply to all custodians of health-care data, so GLBA does not apply to all who
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-report-congress/priv-
2 3a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UXR2-VQLC]. The FIPPs are principles or properties of privacy codes that were
initially developed by the FTC but are now featured in codes across the world.
16. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012).
17. Episode 7: Mark Rothstein, Big Data & Health Research, Apple ResearchKit, White House
Consumer Privacy Bill, WEEK HEALTH L. (Apr. 8, 2015), http://twihl.podbean.com/e/7-mark-
rothstein-big-data-health-research-apple-researchkit-white-house-consumer-privacy-bill/
[https://perma.cc/LQ48-W2RL].
18. Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework for Protecting Privacy and
Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy, WHITE HouSE, 6 (Feb. 2012),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YS7-FWWH]
[hereinafter Framework for Protecting Privacy].
19. Commercial Data Privacy and Innovation in the Internet Economy: Dynamic Policy
Framework, U.S. DEP'T COM. 60 (Dec. 2010), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/report/2010/commercial-
data-privacy-and- innovation-interet-economy-dynamic-policy-framework
[https://perma.cc/PG6Z-V6HM] (summarizing commenters).
20. Id. at 59.
21. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 501, 113 Stat. 1338, 1436-37 (1999).
See generally Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information
Privacy, and the Limits ofDefault Rules, 86 MINN. L. REv. 1219, 1219-20 (2002).
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hold consumer financial data.2 2 And like HIPAA, GLBA is a downstream data-
protection model that erects a duty of confidentiality23 and requires notice to
consumers of an institution's privacy policies and practices.24 The Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA) applies to consumer reporting agencies regarding
important if narrow requirements relating to quality, transparency, and access.25
Other examples cover still narrower sectors such as video rental records.26 Even
now, with the sectoral approach to data protection understood as causing severe
regulatory gaps, calls for narrowly focused "fixes" continue, whether to protect
student records from big data brokers27 or to prevent automobiles from "spying"
on their drivers.2 8
A sectoral approach to data protection has other flaws. For example, sectoral
models inevitably encourage differential levels of protection, and that more often
promotes a race to the bottom rather than to the top. Worse, high levels of
protection can be characterized as outliers and targeted for "reform."
This sectoral limitation of substantive law spills over into rulemaking and
enforcement. Inter-agency cooperation has never been a core strength of the
federal government, and turf wars likely exacerbate regulatory gaps. It is one
thing not to have a comprehensive privacy model. It is another not to have a
unified data-protection agency. For example, the European Union has had a
(relatively) uniform law since 1995 .29 The new General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR)o has attracted interest because of its erasure' and breach
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 6805(a) (2012). Notwithstanding, the FTC does have some broad residual
powers. See Privacy of Consumer Financial Information; Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 33,646 (May 24,
2000) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 313).
23. 15 U.S.C § 6802(a)(1) (2012) (requiring non-disclosure of "nonpublic personal
information" to "nonaffiliated third parties").
24. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6803(a), (c) (2012).
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2012).
26. Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195. See generally Mollett v. Netflix, Inc., 795 F.3d 1062
(9th Cir. 2015). For more examples of narrow, sectoral legislation see Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and
Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1393,
1440-44 (2001).
27. See, e.g., Press Release, Sen. Ed Markey, Sens. Markey & Hatch Reintroduce Bipartisan
Legislation to Protect Student Privacy (May 13, 2015), http://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-
releases/sens-markey-and-hatch-reintroduce-bipartisan-legislation-to-protect-student-privacy
[https://perma.cc/AD5Y-7JP9].
28. Press Release, Sen. Ed Markey, Sens. Markey, Blumenthal Introduce Legislation to Protect
Drivers from Auto Security, Privacy Risks with Standards & "Cyber Dashboard" Rating System
(July 21, 2015), http://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/sens-markey-blumenthal-
introduce-legislation-to-protect-drivers-from-auto-security-privacy-risks-with-standards-and-cyber-
dashboard-rating-system [https://perma.cc/2ZMZ-BMWA].
29. Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on
the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281/31), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:31995LOO46 [https://perma.cc/S49Z-VL4V].
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notification32 provisions. However, arguably one of its most significant
achievements is to make enforcement and interpretation more consistent across
the EU by designating a primary, "one-stop shop" regulator33 and promoting
additional coordination through the European Data Protection Board.34
Of course, the observation that U.S. data protection is flawed because of its
sectoral nature is only part of the story. The sectors (including health care) are
narrowly defined. After conventional health and, arguably3 1 financial services,
the drop off in protections is sharp. In large part, this is because the United States
has favored relatively-low-protection models, most of which are downstream.
B. Upstream vs. Downstream Protection Models
The upstream-downstream typology described here may appear somewhat
complex. However, its origins can be traced to a much simpler relationship-that
between privacy and confidentiality. According to Tom Beauchamp and James
Childress:
[A]n infringement of a person's right to confidentiality occurs only if
the person or institution to whom the information was disclosed in
confidence fails to protect the information or deliberately discloses it to
someone without first-party consent. By contrast, a person who, without
authorization, enters a hospital record room or computer database
violates rights of privacy but does not violate rights of confidentiality.
Only the person or institution that obtains information in a confidential
relationship can be charged with violating rights of confidentiality.
This description captures a clear process chronology. First, "privacy"
April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1
(General Data Protection Regulation), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L.2016.119.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2016:119:TOC
[https://perma.cc/R5NP-FR2Z].
31. Id. art. 17.
32. Id. arts. 33-34.
33. Id. arts. 56-65.
34. Id. arts. 68-76.
35. Cf Kathleen A. Hardee, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: Five Years After Implementation,
Does The Emperor Wear Clothes?, 39 CREIGHTON L. REv. 915 (2006).
36. Tom L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 316-17
(7th ed. 2013); see also Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 696 P.2d 527 (Or. 1985)
("Although claims of a breach of privacy and of wrongful disclosure of confidential information
may seem very similar in a case like the present, which involves the disclosure of an intimate
personal secret, the two claims depend on different premises and cover different ground ... [T]he
most important distinction is that only one who holds information in confidence can be charged
with a breach of confidence. If an act qualifies as a tortious invasion of privacy, it theoretically
could be committed by anyone.")
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protects against the unauthorized collection of health-care data. Subsequently,
once the collection has been authorized, the recipient subsequently owes a duty
of "confidentiality" not to disclose the data. That is, privacy (different flavors of
which either prohibit or place limitations or conditions on the collection of data)
protects data upstream of confidentiality.
Thus, the lifecycle of data can be mapped to a timeline-based typology. That
typology may be expanded beyond "privacy" and "confidentiality" to include
other data-protective models including core FIPPS, such as transparency,
individual participation (including consent, access, correction, and redress),
purpose specification, data mininization, use limitation, data quality and
integrity, security, accountability, and auditing.37 In broad terms, models that are
applicable before or during collection are labeled "upstream," while those
applied post-collection are labeled "downstream."
To privacy (upstream) and confidentiality (downstream) I now add some
other basic data protection models (which may or may not be deployed by
ethical, legal, or technological systems) such as anonymization, de-
identification,38 breach notification, inalienability, point-of-use regulation, or
security.
Anonymizing data prior to any collection or using something like an
inalienability or market inalienability39 rule to reduce the use case/value of the
data will tend to reduce the likelihood that the data are collected.
Upstream Models
Model Detail
Anonymization Mandates removal of certain identifiers before data
can be collected
Inalienability Prohibits transfer of certain data, thus reducing
their value and disincentivizing collection
Privacy Prohibits or places limitations or conditions on the
collection of data
37. National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace: Enhancing Online Choice,
Efficiency, Security, and Privacy, WHITE HOUSE 45 (April 2011),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rssviewer/NSTICstrategy_041511 .pdf
[https://perma.cc/7JH3-MX7P].
38. While anonymization removes all associations between data and data subject, de-
identification removes only select associations, leaving open the possibility, however slight, of re-
identification. See generally Simson L. Garfinkel, De-Identification of Personal Information, U.S.
DEP'T COM. NAT. INST. STANDARDS TECH., 2 (October 2015),
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2015/NISTIR.8053.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q898-QD5K].
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In contrast, point-of-use regulation (such as the prohibition of discriminatory








Prohibits the use of legally collected data for
certain (typically discriminatory) purposes
Requires perimeter, encryption, or behavioral
controls to impede unauthorized data access
Prohibits data disclosure by data custodiani or
limits disclosure to certain persons or for certain
purposes
Obligates data custodian to disclose
compromise to data subject and/or regulator
data
This basic upstream-downstream relational structure may now be expanded
to include other protective sub-models and also cross-walked to FIPPS.
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This more complex representation also reflects that some protections (for
example, transparency or, where they overlap, anonymization and de-
identification) can occur at multiple times in the lifecycle of the data. Note also
that some sub-models are complimentary. For example, the upstream privacy
(collection) sub-model that prohibits collection of data other than for a disclosed
purpose would likely be complemented by a downstream prohibition on
disclosure other than for the stated purpose.
I suggest several interrelated takeaways from this typology. First, and most




Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 17 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol17/iss1/3
HEALTH-CARE DATA PROTECTION
choose from a broad array of data protection models. Having a comprehensive
toolbox should help regulators finely calibrate their approach to particular data
risks and help them be prepared to deal with evolving or currently unknown data
risks.
Second, a broad understanding of the various data protection models and
their relative approaches to protecting data should make it less likely that
policymakers and data custodians will resort to generalized statements about
protecting data. For example, those who use "privacy" rhetoric should have their
feet held to the fire about the specifics of their calls for more or less data
protection.
Third, the complexity of this typology is worthwhile if it helps push back
against the tendency to reduce policy discussions to binaries or other over-
simplifications. Even a creaking common law found room for both privacy and
confidentiality models, while today policymakers and regulators can choose from
an array of upstream and downstream data protection models. For example, it has
been common for mainstream data protection proposals to exclude data or data
custodians subject to HIPAA. 4 0 However, once it is appreciated that HIPAA is a
downstream confidentiality model, it makes sense to include health care in
discussions about the adoption of future upstream protective models.
Finally, this typology locates health-care data protection within the
mainstream of data protection. Mainstream data protection should embrace
health-care data protection as one of its own and learn from its experiences. The
resolutely downstream, highly detailed, prescriptive HIPAA privacy rule is
unique and the law and policy literature surrounding it is robust. This is a two-
way street. As argued below, health-care data protection needs to move beyond
its HIPAA-centricity and see what additional models could be used to protect
health-care data generated or used both inside and outside of traditional health-
care environments. Non-health-care domains, conversely, should learn from
health care's twenty years of experience with HIPAA.
II. REGULATORY TURBULENCE, DISRUPTION & ARBITRAGE
Regulatory turbulence, disruption, and arbitrage presuppose the
juxtaposition of at least two regulatory domains. In the simplest case, one domain
would be regulated, the other unregulated. Turbulence and disruption exist on a
continuum. Regulatory turbulence may be only transient or, in the scheme of
things, relatively benign. Regulatory disruption has more permanent and serious
40. See, e.g., Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations for
Businesses and Policymakers, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, i-v (Mar. 2012),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-report-
protecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VJ9Q-KQU4] [hereinafter Protecting Consumer Privacy]; Framework for
Protecting Privacy, supra note 18, at 38.
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implications. Regulatory arbitrage occurs when a business purposefully exploits
disruption, making business choices on the basis of the difference between the
two regulatory domains.
A slightly different way to think about these phenomena is to posit
horizontal and vertical products. Turbulence and disruption occur when
horizontal business products (for example, cloud services or smartphone
platforms) are dropped into vertical markets without regard to potentially unique
regulatory issues. On the other hand, arbitrage tends to occur when a business is
aware of a vertical market's unique regulation and builds a surrogate or proxy
business in a less regulated vertical market.
A. Turbulence and Disruption
Regulatory turbulence, disruption and potentially arbitrage will most likely
occur following some type of business disruption. True to Clayton Christensen's
classic disruption theory,4 1 such a business disruption frequently occurs because a
disruptive technological innovation has empowered an entrant attacker to
challenge mainstream industry incumbents.42 Disruptive technologies may
initially underperform (or undershoot) incumbents' sustaining technologies.
However, disruptive technologies "are typically cheaper, simpler, smaller, and,
frequently, more convenient to use."43 Business disruption can also include
"[n]ew-market disruptive innovations," which "occur when characteristics of
existing products limit the number of potential consumers or force consumption
to take place in inconvenient, centralized settings."44
Regulatory turbulence and disruption tend to develop in parallel with or soon
after business disruption. Take ride-hailing services typified by Uber45 or Lyft. 46
They generally obey the business disruption model. Incumbent taxi services,
although featuring (apparently) professionally-trained drivers, access at major
locations, and liveried cabs, rely on sustaining technologies such as telephone
bookings or in-person ride-hailing, and cash or often poorly implemented credit
card payments. Disruptive ride-hailing services leverage spare capacity in private
owners' vehicles, ubiquitous mobile communication, expanded locations, and
payment services to deliver nimbler, more convenient services. The core "assets"
41. See, e.g., CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR'S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW
TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS To FAIL (1997).
42. See generally Nicolas P. Terry, Information Technology's Failure to Disrupt Health Care,
13 NEV. L.J. 722 (2013).
43. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 41, at xv.
44. CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN ET AL., SEEING WHAT'S NEXT: USING THE THEORIES OF
INNOVATION TO PREDICT INDUSTRY CHANGE xvii (2004).
45. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., https://www.uber.com [https://perma.cc/7R88-X93Q].
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of ride-hailing or housing (such as Airbnb47) businesses are traditionally-
underused resources that modem technologies can easily make available to a
"sharing economy." In addition, their business models clearly embrace regulatory
disruption.
Ride-hailing services initially caused regulatory turbulence, based on
uncertainty as to whether they were subject to existing regulatory models.
Indeed, this appeared to be a deliberate part of their disruptive strategy. Uber, in
particular, challenged local regulations or argued they were ambiguous. Their
CEO noting in 2013: "It's a regulatory disruption . . . We don't talk about that a
lot in tech. But you can disrupt from all sorts of directions."4 8 These businesses,
whether sharing unused automobile or housing resources, at the root are adopting
business models that seek to reduce costs relative to incumbent competitors by
avoiding or marginalizing self-regulatory organizations (such as guilds49),
governmental rationing (such as medallionsso), or regulatory models (such as
licensuresi or employment lawS5 2).
Initial regulatory turbulence buys time during which the innovator can press
for accommodating regulatory compromises (that themselves further continued
47. AIRBNB, INC., https://www.airbnb.com [https://perma.cc/5XQ8-LEV9].
48. Uber CEO Talks Regulatory Disruption, Maintaining Startup Culture, MIT SLOAN MGMT.
(Nov. 6, 2013), http://mitsloan.mit.edu/newsroom/articles/uber-ceo-talks-regulatory-disruption-
maintaining-startup-culture [https://perma.cc/NG3C-XWC7].
49. See generally Justin Fox, The Problem with Guilds, from Silversmiths to Taxi Drivers,
HARV. Bus. REv. (Dec. 4, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/12/the-problem-with-guilds-from-
silversmiths-to-taxi-drivers [https://perma.cc/G5YR-45H5]; see also, Erik Engquist, Judge Rules




50. Aamer Madhani, Once a Sure Bet, Taxi Medallions Becoming Unsellable, USA TODAY
(May 18, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/05/17/taxi-medallion-values-decline-
uber-rideshare/27314735 [https://perma.cc/VD9D-NJ65].
51. See, e.g., Colleen Wright, Uber Says Proposed Freeze on Licenses in New York City Would
Limit Competition, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/01/nyregion/uber-
says-proposed-freeze-on-licenses-would-limit-competition.html [https://perma.cc/R2MN-JU39]; see
also Sebastian Anthony, London Mayor Says Uber Is Systematically Breaking the Law, ARS TECHNICA
(Oct. 5, 2015), http://arstechnica.com/cars/2015/10/boris-johnson-says-uber-is-systematically-
breaking-the-law-in-london [https://perma.cc/7SGM-R4XN]; Leon Daniels, Transport for London:
Uber and London's Private Hire Trade Need New Regulations, CITY A.M., LTD. (Oct. 20, 2015),
http://www.cityam.com/226929/transport-for-london-uber-and-londons-private-hire-trade-need-
new-regulations [https://perma.cc/7AR2-8DCW]. Leah Thorsen, Defying Regulators, Uber




52. See, e.g., Sean Buckley, California Unemployment Office Says Uber Driver was an
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disruption) or create or exploit regulatory gaps (enabling regulatory arbitrage).5 3
All the while, the disruptive services and their technologies mature, cease
undershooting the incumbents, and gain popularity and market share that
regulators will fear to reverse.5 4 Former White House aide Ron Klain describes
the phenomenon as follows:
[W]hat these Internet 3.0 companies are disrupting is not really
technology, but regulatory regimes. What makes AirBnb exceptional is
not any technological breakthrough, but how it is challenging local
hospitality regulation, condo board rules, and all the other limitations on
who can charge what and when for short-term housing usage.
Crowdfunding sites likewise use technology that has been around for
years: what they are disrupting is the vast array of federal and state
regulations that govern who can invest in what, and under what terms.
The same is true of so many other emerging Internet companies: their
impact is far more in disrupting governmental and quasi-governmental
rules than it is in technological breakthroughs."
While policy and political allegiances slowly determine a regulatory re-
calibration, incumbents and attackers operate in an uneven, even incoherent
regulatory system that applies different rules to what should be competing
services.
In the health-care space, some service providers claim or are hailed as
having Uber-like characteristics. For example, American Well promises 24x7
doctor consultations,6 while Heal5 7 and pager" promise timely house calls by a
physician. However, these are far less disruptive than they appear at first sight.
They generally are respectful of regulatory systems and while leveraging mobile
technologies do not attack incumbents' features, such as third party
53. Cf Amar Toor, Uber Drivers Stage Protest over French Response to Taxi Strike, VERGE
(Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.theverge.com/2016/2/3/10903662/uber-protest-paris-taxi-strike-vtc
[https://perma.cc/N448-SYDD].
54. Of course, there are exceptions. See Mark Scott, Uber's No-Holds-Barred Expansion
Strategy Fizzles in Germany, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/04
/technology/ubers-no-holds-barred-expansion-strategy-fizzles-in-germany.html
[https://perma.cc/Q4GT-3S58].
55. Ron Klain, Airbnb's Biggest Disruption: America's Laws, FORTUNE (Sept. 10, 2014),
http://fortune.com/2014/09/10/airbnbs-biggest-disruption-americas-laws [https://perma.cc/MJY3-
U2PX].
56. AMERICAN WELL, https://www.americanwell.com/how-it-works [https://perna.cc/5B5Q-
JZXT].
57. What is Heal?, HEAL, https://help.getheal.com/hc/en-us/articles/204181405-What-is-Heal
[https://perma.cc/248B-3WKQ ]; see generally Kavita Daswani, Feeling Sick? How About a House
Call from a Doctor? A New App, Heal, Makes it Happen, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2015),
http://www.latimes.com/health/la-he-heal-at-home-20151107-story.html [https://perma.cc/MC8X-
QF99].
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reimbursement. So far, they have opted for more of a concierge model that has
limited scalability.
Indeed, business disruption has generally failed in the health-care space. The
most conspicuous failure has been Google's failed challenge to the data
hegemony of incumbent health-care entities by offering low-cost personal health
records (PHRs)." The low level of business disruption probably explains the
relatively low level of regulatory turbulence or disruption in the domain, at least
until recently.
There are several reasons why technology companies have found health care
difficult to disrupt. The dominant reason is health care's primary financing
model. "Third-party reimbursement systems sap motivation for innovation-
particularly disruptive innovation-out of the system.""o However, there are
additional, deep-seated causes. Thus, the "meaningful use" debacle suggests that
while market failure was one explanation for the slow adoption of Electronic
Health Records (EHRs), underperforming products may have been as salient.
6 1
Further, information technologies may not be a good fit for current, unreformed
health care. Information technology maps best to processes, not health care's
flawed episodic nature. Additionally, information technologies thrive on liquid
data, which health care still struggles to promote.62 It is also possible that
technology companies, perhaps fooled by the presence of vertical integration and
positive outliers (such as the VA or Kaiser Permanente), underestimated the
challenge of changing culturally constipated, heterogeneous providers.
Notwithstanding the absence of direct business disruption, two phenomena,
big data collection and mobile health, are proving to be indirectly disruptive-
with the potential to move into a more direct mode. Indeed, the argument can be
made that mobile health is an example of Uber-like regulatory disruption or
"uberfication," a disruptive, tech-heavy approach that promotes "uber-
convenience" through always-on mobile services that instantly match patient
demand with health-care supply. Both mobile health and big data analytics have
developed primarily outside of (and sometimes in parallel to) traditional health-
care spaces. As their overlaps increase, however, they are also providing
technologically-mediated alternatives to traditional health-care interactions,
services, and data. In this regard, they offer the potential for business disruption.
As discussed below, they are already disrupting regulatory models and exhibiting
some arbitrage.63
59. See infra text accompanying note 117.
60. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 44, at 197.
61. Nicolas P. Terry, Pit Crews With Computers: Can Health Information Technology Fix
Fragmented Care?, 14 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 129, 168-75 (2014).
62. Id.
63. See infra text accompanying note 196, 212.
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B. Arbitrage
In Victor Fleischer's words, regulatory arbitrage "exploits the gap between
the economic substance of a transaction and its legal or regulatory treatment . .
."' However, Fleischer was primarily interested in "regulatory gamesmanship"
and modeling the tradeoff between regulatory and transaction costs. The
examination of regulatory arbitrage in this article more closely resembles
leveraging differences in regulatory substance between different jurisdictions. A
well-known example is the "double-Irish," when a taxpayer shifts income out of
a high-tax jurisdiction into a tax haven." Examples in the health-care domain
would include Israeli gays, prohibited by domestic law from using surrogacy,
employing third world surrogates instead,66 a UK resident avoiding a health-care
shortage (wait-list) by having the procedure performed elsewhere in the
European Union and subsequently requiring the UK to reimburse them, 6  and
providers attracting patients to jurisdictions where CRISPR-Cas gene editing is
available.6 8
Of course, the issue discussed herein is not transnational, but rather domestic
arbitrage that exploits variances between U.S. regulatory silos. An evolving
example of domestic regulatory disruption or arbitrage in our health-care domain
is the growing "off-label use" of FDA approved drugs. Two "disruptions"
enabled the regulatory arbitrage. First, business disruption created massive (and
highly profitable) markets for unapproved uses. Second, the legal disruption (or
"First Amendment opportunism"6 ) caused by the rapid development of
(commercial) speech jurisprudence.70
64. Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEx. L. REv. 227, 229 (2010).
65. See, e.g., Death of the Double Irish, ECONOMIST (Oct. 18, 2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21625876-irish-government-plans-alter-
one-its-more-controversial-tax [https://perma.cc/NTS3-JEPT]; see generally Annelise Riles,
Managing Regulatory Arbitrage: A Conflict ofLaws Approach, 47 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 63 (2014).
66. Ruth English, Among Nepal's Earthquake Survivors: Israeli Gays and Their Surrogate
Babies, WASH. PosT (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/how-an-earthquake-
highlighted-the-plight-of-israeli-gays-and-their-surrogate-babies/201 5/04/29/419d60e8-ecf0- 11 e4-
8050-839e9234b303_story.html [https://perma.cc/39M7-P964].
67. See C-372/04, Watts v. Bedford Primary Care Trust, 2006 E.C.J. 1-04325; see generally
Nicolas P. Terry, Under-Regulated Healthcare Phenomena in a Flat World: Medical Tourism and
Outsourcing, 29 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 421-72 (2007).
68. See, e.g., R. Alta Charo, On the Road (to a Cure?)-Stem-Cell Tourism and Lessons for
Gene Editing, 374 NEw ENG. J. MED. 901 (2016).
69. FREDERICK SCHAUER ET AL., ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA
175-76 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2001).
70. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2653 (2011). See generally Jennifer M.
Keighley, Can You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 15
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 539 (2012); Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled
Commercial Speech and Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood,
40 VAL. U. L. REV. 555 (2006). See also Aaron S. Kesselheim, Off-Label Drug Use and Promotion:
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In U.S. v. Caronia, the Second Circuit overturned the conviction of a drug
representative for promoting an off-label use of a central nervous system
depressant. Applying strict scrutiny, the court held the government could not
prosecute manufacturers or representatives for speech promoting the lawful, off-
label use of an approved drug." Dissenting, Judge Livingston recognized the
regulatory disruption caused by her colleagues. "[T]he majority calls into
question the very foundations of our century-old system of drug regulation."72
The court described the regulatory gap exploited by the drug company as
follows: "[t]o obtain FDA approval, drug manufacturers are required to
demonstrate, through clinical trials, the safety and efficacy of a new drug for
each intended use or indication" but that "[o]nce FDA-approved, prescription
drugs can be prescribed by doctors for both FDA-approved and -unapproved
uses; the FDA generally does not regulate how physicians use approved drugs."73
By marketing its regulated drug to unregulated (in this context) physicians, the
drug company created regulatory disruption. Subsequently, in Amarin Pharma,
Inc. v. FDA, a district court rejected FDA's narrow reading of Caronia and
enjoined the agency from threatening a misbranding action in another off-label
use case because it chilled protected speech.74 One of the FDA's goals in
pursuing such actions is to "encourage use of the FDA's drug review and
approval process" and "deter manufacturers from evading the FDA's review
process for additional uses of approved drugs."" By leveraging the differential
regulatory models applied to drug manufacturers and doctors, the industry is
avoiding that very process.
C. Implications ofRegulatory Disruption and Arbitrage
As discussed above, using ride-hailing and accommodation-sharing services
as examples, regulatory turbulence tends to create uncertainty, which increases
information costs among market participants, policymakers, and regulators. This
may be followed by far more serious regulatory disruption where incumbents and
attackers face uneven policy environments. These defacto differential regulatory
environments may be a product of non-enforcement by regulators. For example,
regulators may exercise discretion for fear of, say, frustrating innovation or the
political cost of "interfering" with a popular new service. Equally, in an attempt
71. 703 F.3d 149, 169 (2nd Cir. 2012).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 153 (citations omitted).
74. 119 F. Supp. 3d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). Subsequently Amarin and FDA settled the case.
Order of Settlement, Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA, 119 F. Supp. 3d 196 (S.D.N.Y 2015) (No. 1:15-
CV-03588). See also Kathleen M Sanzo, Lisa D. Dykstra & Jacqueline R. Berman, FDA and
Amarin Reach Settlement on First Amendment and Off-Label Statements, NAT'L L. REv. (Mar. 10,
2016), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/fda-and-amarin-reach-settlement-first-amendment-
and-label-statements [https://perma.cc/7GYE-LDTR].
75. Amarin, 119 F. Supp. 3d at 205.
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to deal temporarily with disruption during a time of policy recalibration, agencies
might issue sub-regulatory "guidances." Seeking to be supportive of both
incumbents and innovators can be unclear, so the regulatory guidances create
ambiguity and therefore increase disruption. In the data space, regulatory
disruption does not stop with similar data being subject to differential regulation.
Additionally, data subjects may experience regulatory "chum" during their
lifecycle, as data repeatedly enter or exit regulated and lightly regulated spaces
(or even exist in both spaces simultaneously), further adding to the information
costs in identifying a current regulatory state.
III. EXCEPTIONALISM AND THE HEALTH-CARE DATA PROTECTION MODEL
HIPAA has been one of the most consistently criticized regulatory constructs
in the health-care sector.76 Yet, its levels of data protection and enforcement
likely would provoke envy from data subjects in other domains. HIPAA provides
relatively robust protections against unauthorized uses of health information by a
relatively narrow set of traditional health-care provider data custodians. Its
inherent limitations are because of its narrow domain inclusions (some traditional
health-care providers and insurers, not all custodians of health-care data) and
because it uses downstream data protection modes (that is, it does almost nothing
to regulate the collection of health data). An accurately labeled HIPAA privacy
rule would be something like "the doctor/hospital/insurer" confidentiality rule.
The other HIPAA rules-security and breach notification-have the same
limitations; U.S. health-care data protection is not only sectoral, but also almost
completely downstream.
A. Sectoral Model
As noted by the White House report on big data, "[i]n the United States
during the 1970s and 80s, narrowly-tailored sectoral privacy laws began to
supplement the tort-based body of common law. These sector-specific laws
create privacy safeguards that apply only to specific types of entities and data."77
When HIPAA was originally drafted, there was every reason to believe that the
domain-limited model was intended, in large part, to separate health-care data
76. See, e.g., Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality of
Electronic Health Records, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 681 (2007); Nicolas P. Terry, What's Wrong with
Health Privacy?, 5 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 1 (2009). More recently, see Charles Ornstein &
Annie Waldman, Few Consequences for Health Privacy Law's Repeat Offenders, PROPUBLICA
(Dec. 29, 2015), https://www.propublica.org/article/few-consequences-for-health-privacy-law-
repeat-offenders [https://perma.cc/LD6S-FJNA]; Mark Rothstein, The End of the HIPAA Privacy
Rule?, 44 J.L. MED. & ETHICs 352 (2016).
77. Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values, WHITE HousE 18 (May 2014),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/bigdataprivacyreport may_1_2014.pdf
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from financial services data.8
There could have been no misapprehension that all health-care data
custodians would be covered by the rule given the limitations of the enabling
legislation.79 The likely proof is that the coverage of outsiders such as law firms
and marketing companies had to be "patched" with mandatory contracts between
insider-covered entities and their outsider "business associate."8 It was not until
2009 when additional statutory authority provided by the Health Information
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act' allowed for their
direct regulation.82 Similarly, it was apparent early on that neither life insurers,
nor most employers" (except to the extent that they were also health plan
administrators8 4) were covered. Those exceptions aside, HIPAA appeared to
blanket health care, at least as we knew it in 1999. This was achieved using
sector-specific language: "(1) A health plan. (2) A health care clearinghouse. (3)
A health care provider who transmits any health information in electronic form in
connection with a transaction. . ."85
Ignoring the technical verbiage, HIPAA regulated health insurers and
traditional health-care providers such as doctors, hospitals and pharmacists.86 A
couple of other limitations to the definition of protected data minimally reduced
the ranks of regulated providers. For example, the requirement of transmittal of
"any health information in electronic form"87 may have excluded some
technologically limited, often rural providers.
Other exclusions are more implicit. For example, only "individually
identifiable health information"88 is protected, and "[h]ealth information that
does not identify an individual . . . is not individually identifiable health
information."89 As a result, de-identified data are not subject to HIPAA
regulation. De-identification may be achieved by the use of the expert (aka
78. See infra text accompanying note 133 et seq.
79. The legislation primarily was concerned with imposing e-commerce models on those
engaged in traditional health-care transactions. Hence, the regulatory authority was limited to
providers, insurers and clearinghouses. See HIPAA Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 262, 110
Stat. 1936, 2021-31 (codified in scattered sections of42 U.S.C.).
80. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.103, 164.502(e), .504(e), .532(d)(e) (2016).
81. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13401, 123 Stat. 115, 260.
82. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.102(b) (2016).
83. 45 C.F.R. § 160.102 (2015) (protected health information).
84. 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(f) (2016).
85. 45 C.F.R. § 160.102 (2016).
86. For a broad critique of the limitations of HIPAA's reach, see Terry & Francis, supra note
76, at 713-17.
87. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2016) (covered entity).
88. 45 C.F.R. § 164.103 (2016).
89. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514 (2016).
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statistical) method"o or the removal of certain identifying elements so as to
trigger a safe harbor.9' Furthermore, an Institutional Review Board (IRB) can, in
limited circumstances, act as a surrogate for individuals and waive
consent/authorization for the use of identifiable data for research purposes.92
Taken together, these provisions suggest that most, but not all, researchers fall
outside of HIPAA regulation, their use of data instead being subject to the
Common Rule.94
As a result, HIPAA's own "original sin" is easy to identify. The data
protection model is structured around a group of identified health-care data
custodians rather than around health-care data. Although HITECH expanded
direct applicability and enforcement to business associates in 2009, it granted no
additional expansion of the Privacy or Security Rules to deal with health-care
data existing outside of the HIPAA-zone. There was one exception: the nature of
which illustrated rather than solved the HIPAA deficit. HITECH provided for a
breach notification rule applicable to the providers of PHRs by some non-
HIPAA-regulated entities. However, it did not extend the HIPAA rule95 to them;
instead, it provided for distinct FTC rule-making for this limited group of non-
HIPAA entities.96 This approach therefore highlights two of the problems
associated with sectoral models: fragmentation of data protection by custodian
type and sector/sub-sector-specific regulators.
B. Downstream Protection Favored
Contemporary health-care data protection is resolutely and almost
exclusively downstream. The HIPAA Privacy Rule employs a downstream data
protection model ("confidentiality") that seeks to contain the collected data
within the health-care system by prohibiting its migration to non-health-care
parties.97 Its complementary Security Rule imposes physical and technological
constraints on patient data storage designed to impede those outside of the health-
care system from acquiring such data without consent.
The only upstream protection in HIPAA, patient consent at initiation of the
provider-patient relationship was, as discussed below,98 removed even before the
90. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(1) (2016).
91. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2) (2016).
92. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2016).
93. Cf 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(e) (2016) (limited data set recipients).
94. See generally Federal Policy for the Protection ofHuman Subjects ('Common Rule'), U.S.
DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/commonrule
[https://perma.cc/273L-SGT2].
95. HITECH Act § 13402, 42 U.S.C. § 17932 (2012) (Omnibus Rule).
96. HITECH Act § 13407, 42 U.S.C. § 17939 (2012) (Health Breach Notification Rule).
97. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2016).
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Privacy Rule came into effect. In modem law, HIPAA aside,9 9 only one health-
care data-protection law, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008
(GINA),' has exhibited any upstream modeling.'oI
Historically, some upstream, collection-centric data protection models, such
as the intentional tort of intrusion into seclusion, have seen limited application in
the health-care domain. However, these have experienced only limited build-out.
Thus, the seclusion tort seems most comfortable when applied to obviously
intentional outlying factual situations such as unconsented-to photography by
physicians.10 Routinely, now, courts seem to prefer the downstream breach of
confidence tort as the dominant common law model of health-care data
protection.103
Even aside from aligning with the prevalent model of U.S. data protection, it
is not hard to explain why health-care data protection opted for a downstream
path. Historically, the culture of medicine has seemed to favor collecting
everything. Such a model was largely uncomplicated given the available
technologies and diagnostic practice. It was also largely uncontroversial in the
context of a traditional, two-party physician-patient relationship; the patient
exercised his or her autonomy rights and disclosed all data to the physician in
return for more effective treatment and a promise of confidentiality. It is hard to
imagine that upstream FIPPS such as context or data minimization would have
been explored in this simple health-care data exchange scenario. Rather, any
conflicts that arose would tend to be dealt with in the framework of restrictions
on data disclosure and the reach of exceptions from it.
It should have been relatively obvious that this model would not scale well
to industrial health care. It is not particularly surprising that the eventual federal
model would persist with downstream protections-it was after all based on state
common law and statutes that also were primarily downstream. Even the latest
addition to the health-care data protection regime, the quintessentially
downstream breach notification rule introduced in 2009, was likely inspired by
99. This is something of an exaggeration as HIPAA and GINA are tied together in some
places, such as by the provisions of the HITECH Act.
100. Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008).
101. See infra text accompanying note 148 et seq. One reviewer made the interesting
observation that medical data used in research may be subject to some upstream regulation under
the Common Rule, 45 C.F.R. pt. 46. This seems correct in at least two situations. First, some
research involving vulnerable populations (such as children or prisoners) is prohibited or regulated
so strictly that it may be impractical. Second, unlike clinical data, the Common Rule does require
consent prior to the collection or use of data and therefore does operate upstream.
102. See, e.g., McCormick v. England, 494 S.E.2d 431, 435 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997); Burger v.
Blair Med. Assocs., 964 A.2d 374, 379 (Pa. 2009); see also Susan Candiotti & Alan Duke, Source:
Joan Rivers'Doctor Took Selfie, Began Biopsy Before Her Cardiac Arrest, CNN (Nov. 11, 2014),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/16/showbiz/joan-rivers-clinic [https://perma.cc/G5CX-NCCD].
103. See, e.g., Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518, 523 (Ohio 1999); Humphers v.
First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 696 P.2d 527 (Or. 1985).
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state models given the absence of any federal example. The shift from individual
to institutional care also highlights a cultural peculiarity with regard to data
"ownership" or its control. While the pre-industrial model was an informal
sharing of responsibilities between physician and patient, joint ownership did not
survive the transition. Today, it is providers who own and control patient data.
Indeed, this is the premise behind HIPAA privacy and security. This is not only
different from the more individual human rights-based protections recognized in
non-US data protection frameworks, but also a major hurdle as reformers seek to
engage patients in their health care, including their data."
Additionally, health-care data protection has appeared increasingly blind to
the impact of information technology. Looking through the health-care industry
lens this should not be too surprising. Almost every contemporary technological
challenge thrown at the health-care industry-Y2K,'o the HIPAA transactional
mandate,106 HIT adoption,' Meaningful Use,0 s and ICD-10' 09 -have been met
with objection and prevarication."0
While it seems a truism that the common law has marched "with medicine
but in the rear and limping a little,""' the lag of regulation in the face of
information technology has been even more marked. If the HIPAA architects
thought they had a fairly good grasp on the health-care domain in the 1990s,
thereafter the vector between regulation and technology has increased
considerably. In hindsight, perhaps the greatest flaw in HIPAA is that it takes a
pre-IT (maybe even pre-industrialized medicine) approach to data use; it is either
permitted or prohibited. That binary may have been appropriate for the limited
records of the Marcus Welby, M.D.-era.12 At the time the HIPAA rules were
first promulgated, EHRs were barely visible and HHS was chasing e-commerce
104. See infra, discussion of "Blue Button," text accompanying note 175 et seq.
105. See generally Lily Rothman, Remember Y2K? Here's How We Prepped for the Non-
Disaster, TIME (Dec. 31, 2014), http://time.com/3645828/y2k-look-back [https://perma.cc/R6ZZ-
Z7SK].
106. Transactions Overview, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.crus.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Administrative-
Simplification/Transactions/TransactionsOverview.html [https://perma.cc/EAG5-QCS9].
107. See generally Nicolas P. Terry, Information Technology's Failure to Disrupt Healthcare,
13 NEV. L.J. 722 (2013).
108. See generally Nicolas P. Terry, Meaningful Adoption: What We Know or Think We Know
About the Financing, Effectiveness, Quality, and Safety of Electronic Medical Records, 34 J. LEGAL
MED. 7 (2013).
109. Data and Systems, MEDICAID.GOv, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-
information/by-topics/data-and-systems/icd-coding/icd.html [https://perma.cc/Y6ZK-E34C].
110. See generally Robert Wachter, Meaningful Use: Born 2009 - Died 2014?, HEALTHCARE IT
NEWS (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/blog/meaningflul-use-born-2009-died-
2014 [https://perma.cc/V8G9-CQS8].
111. Mount Isa Mines vPusey (1970) 125 CLR 383, 395 (Austl.) (Windeyer J).
112. See Marcus Welby, MD., WIKlPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MarcusWelby,_M.D.
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models that were already well-established a decade before in other domains. The
cycle then seemed to repeat. By 2009, the country was in the middle of a federal
initiative to bring EHRs to all hospitals and the same legislation authorized an
expensive subsidy program to catch-up. 3 Yet, most of the data protection
provisions in HITECH were designed to correct or tweak ten-year-old flaws in
HIPAA.1 4
The most "outside-the-box" provision in the HITECH Act was the discrete
breach notification rule for non-HIPAA PHRs. This was the first
acknowledgment hat HIPAA-like data were being created or processed by data
custodians who were not subject to HIPAA. For a brief period in the late 2000s,
PHRs seemed poised to gain some traction as an alternative to the slowing Bush
administration ten-year EHR initiative."' Of the PHRs that were launched in this
period, Google Health was by far the most potentially disruptive. Indeed, it was a
clear example of incipient regulatory arbitrage because Google intended to avoid
HIPAA by dealing directly with patients (data subjects) rather than covered
entities (regulated data custodians)."' Shortly after Google Health launched,
HITECH introduced the Meaningful Use program based around proprietary EHR
formats. Google, its technical model built around open web standards, shuttered
Google Health."' By the time most of the HITECH provisions found a
regulatory form in the 2013 Omnibus Rule, the ball had moved again, with
concerns being raised about big data and mobile health data. More recently,
questions about health-care data protection also have been raised about the
Internet of Things, described by the FTC, as "an interconnected environment
where all manner of objects have a digital presence and the ability to
communicate with other objects and people.""
The sector-based approach to data protection has led to today's chronically
uneven policy environment, causing, as discussed below, regulatory disruption
and enabling arbitrage in the health-care domain. It is policymakers' over-
113. HITECH Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, Title XIII, 123 Stat. 115, 226-79 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2012)).
114. The exception was section 13405(d) prohibiting certain sales of EHR data. See also 45
C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(5)(ii) (2016).
115. Transforming Health Care: The President's Health Information Technology Plan, WHITE
HOUSE: PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BuSH (Jan. 20, 2004), http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/technology/economic policy
20 04O4 /chap3 .html
[https://perma.cc/FHV6-DJYW].
116. Terry, supra note 107, at 745-46.
117. Aaron Brown & Bill Weihl, An Update on Google Health and Google PowerMeter,
GOOGLE BLOG (June 24, 2011), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/update-on-google-health-
and-google.html [https://perma.cc/G3Z3-CVQK]. See generally Nicolas P. Terry, Personal Health
Records: Directing More Costs and Risks to Consumers?, 1 DREXELL. REv. 216 (2009).
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commitment to downstream rules that makes reform problematic, however.
Arguably, tweaked downstream rules cannot deal with the challenges to health-
care data protection; upstream models must also be deployed.
C. Understanding Exceptional Health-Care Data Protection
To an extent, health-care data privacy exceptionalism has enjoyed more
legal recognition than health-care exceptionalism, although that may now be
changing. The exceptional treatment of health care was dealt a blow in National
Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius when a Supreme Court
majority rejected any special treatment under the Commerce or Necessary &
Proper Clauses.l19 Yet, three years later in King v. Burwell, an exceptionalism
argument found favor with the majority. There Chief Justice Roberts justified the
adoption of a Chevron zero approach to interpretation of the Affordable Care
Actl 20 on the fact that the Act's insurance provisions raised issues of "deep
'economic and political significance."'l21 The opinion later held: "Congress
passed the Affordable Care Act to improve health insurance markets, not to
destroy them. If at all possible, we must interpret the Act in a way that is
consistent with the former, and avoids the latter."l22 Certainly, exceptionalism
would explain Justice Scalia's scathing comment in the dissent, "[w]e should
start calling this law SCOTUScare."l2 3
Health-care data protection exceptionalism has had a far more consistent
history, and HIPAA still stands tall when compared to protections given to
personal data in other sectors. This exceptional protection is of great importance.
Outside of health care, there is no history or expectation of strong data protection
in the U.S. Of course, there are other protected sectors, but the level of data
protection is relatively low or prefers data-custodian-favoring choice
architectures such as opt-out. Outside of health care, the mantras of "get over
it,"' 24 self-regulation, and market solutions have gained more traction. The health
data protection model has a far stronger baseline that resists the arguments of
privacy defeatists.
The story of exceptional health-care data protection has one additional
implication: the relative isolation of health-care data protection from general data
protection. Health-care lawyers may not be to blame here. After all, HIPAA's
119. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). See generally Abigail R. Moncrieff, Understanding the Failure of
Healthcare Exceptionalism in the Supreme Court's Obamacare Decision, 142 CHEST 559, 559-60
(2012).
120. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REv. 187 (2006).
121. 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015).
122. Id. at 2496.
123. Id. at 2507.
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"more stringent than" cooperative preemption model accepts that HIPAA
provides a privacy and security floor permitting federal law's deferral to some
state laws.125 Further, health privacy policymakers have recognized that HIPAA's
downstream models normatively are not the end of the line, recognizing that
health-care entities also should conduct themselves by reference to FIPPS.12
6 If
anything, the difficulty is that health-care data protection issues have been
shunned by those outside the field. HIPAA seems to be viewed as sui generis and
health-care data protection as "solved." For example, two reports issued in 2012
by the White House and the FTC excluded health-care data from their data
protection proposals.127 However, this situation may be turning around. For
instance, in its 2014 Data Brokers report, the FTC included the health domain in
its study, even making a specific legislative recommendation to acquire the
express consent of data subjects before adding health-care data.1
28 Looking
forward, general data protection should learn from health care's experience in
dealing with downstream protective models. Similarly, policymakers revisiting
health-care data protection need to accept that many of its issues cannot be
handled by older models such as HIPAA or common law confidentiality.
1. History ofExceptionalism
Neither historically nor in modem law has the action for breach of
confidence been unique to health-care relationships. Notwithstanding this fact,
actions involving physicians are disproportionately represented in the confidence
jurisprudence and the physician-patient fiduciary relationship seems to have been
a powerful rationale upon which the various doctrinal bases have rested.
Consider, for example, some of the very earliest breach of confidence cases that
based the action (too early to call it a tort) on positive duties imposed by medical
licensure statutes.129 Later cases would
[Rlely on various sources of public policy favoring the confidentiality
of communications between a physician and a patient, including state
licensing or testimonial privilege statutes, or the Principles of Medical
Ethics of the American Medical Association (1957), Section 9, or the
Oath of Hippocrates. Some note that while public policy considerations
125. 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b) (2016).
126. Letter from Paul Tang, Vice Chair, HIT Policy Comm., to Dr. David Blumenthal, Nat'l
Coordinator, Health Info. Tech. at 2-3 (Sept. 1, 2010),
http://www.healthit.gov/sites/faca/files/hitpc transmittal_p_stt 9_1_10_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/22ZW-UXNM].
127. Framework for Protecting Privacy, supra note 18, at 38; Protecting Consumer Privacy,
supra note 40, at i-v.
128. Data Brokers, supra note 3 at 52.
129. See, e.g., Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 NW. 831, 832 (Neb. 1920); see also Smith v.
Driscoll, 162 P. 572 (Wash. 1917).
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are a sound enough basis to support liability, a more appropriate basis
can be found in the nature of the physician-patient relationship itself,
either because of its fiduciary character or because it is customarily
understood to carry an obligation of secrecy and confidence.130
Today, breach of confidence is recognized as a tort of general
applicability.13' However, just as its genesis depended on health-care-specific
doctrines, so its primary usage remains in the health-care domain. Indeed, the tort
can lay claim to being the first exceptional protection of health-care data.
In 1999, representing physician organizations, Dr. Richard Harding testified
before the House of Representatives and argued, "[i]t is critically important to
recognize the difference between medical records privacy and financial privacy"
because "damages from breaches of medical records privacy are of a different
nature." 32 This he ascribed to the extremely sensitive nature of the information
contained therein, "heart disease, terminal illness, domestic violence, and other
women's health issues, psychiatric treatment, alcoholism and drug abuse,
sexually transmitted diseases and even adultery" that, if disclosed "can
jeopardize our careers, our friendships, and even our marriages."'33
The well-respected Institute of Medicine has long endorsed exceptionalism:
For the most part, privacy law in [the United States] has been
formulated under the assumption that holders of information about
people may generally do with it what they please, constrained only by
corporate ethics and the good taste of business, societal acceptance (or
outrage), occasional attention by the government, pressures of consumer
activist groups, and the consequences of legal actions brought by
individuals or consumer groups. This historical view may prove
inappropriate or even dangerous in regard to health data.'34
Of course, the ultimate proof of exceptionalism is almost two decades of
HIPAA itself and the simple fact that the largest industry in the United States is
subject to the country's most comprehensive, if flawed, data protection regulation
and enforcement. Although disliked by powerful health-care interests,' HIPAA
has not faced any significant challenges. When President George W. Bush came
into office, the HIPAA Privacy rule had only just been issued by Donna Shalala,
130. Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518, 523 (Ohio 1999).
13 1. Id.
132. Financial Services Act of 1999, H.R. 10, 106th Cong. § 351 (1999) (addressing the
confidentiality of health and medical information).
133. Id.
134. HEALTH DATA IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 2, at 191.
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President Clinton's HHS Secretary.'36 Incoming Secretary Tommy Thompson
promised a thorough rethinking of the rule.'37 Yet only minor tweaks were
made,'3 8 and the secretary soon announced, "President Bush wants strong patient
privacy protections put in place now. Therefore, we will immediately begin the
process of implementing the patient privacy rule that will give patients greater
access to their own medical records and more control over how their personal
information is used."'39 In 2009, the bipartisan HITECH Act strengthened
HIPAA privacy, broadened its scope to directly regulate "Business Associates,"
and included authority to issue a health-care data breach notice (recall that
Congress has not been able to pass one of general applicability).
2. Health Subdomain Exceptionalism
Obviously, general health-care data are exceptionally protected. However, a
few of its subdomains exhibit additional levels of exceptionalism.'
4 0 One of these
is actually provided for in the HIPAA Privacy Rule. Process notes taken by
psychotherapists are personal notes and "typically are not required or useful for
treatment, payment, or health care operations purposes, other than by the mental
health professional who created the notes."'4 ' As a result, the Privacy Rule
therefore applies exceptional restrictions on patient access and health-care
provider disclosure.42
Moving outside of HIPAA, several subdomains exhibit enhanced
136. Beth Wilson, Clinton Issues Health Privacy Rules, AMARILLO GLOBE-NEWS (Dec. 21, 2000),
http://amarillo.com/stories/2000/12/21/usnclintonissues.shtml#.VfBV47SRq-
[https://perma.cc/25GU-D98A].
137. HHS Moves to Implement and Modify HIPAA Privacy Rules, AUNTMINNIE.COM (Apr. 12,
2001), http://www.auntminnie.com/index.aspx?sec=ser&sub-def&pag-dis&ItemlD=50551
[https://perma.cc/8JQY-RCTXI.
138. For example, replacing the original requirement of consent, see 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(a),
with a privacy notice, see id. § 164.506(b)(1) (2016).
139. Press Release, U.S. Dep't Health & Hum. Servs., Statement by Tommy G. Thompson,
Secretary Department of Health and Human Services (Apr. 12, 2001),
http://archive.hhs.gov/news/press/2001pres/
20010412.html [https://perma.cc/G34Y-E3MS].
140. The list of examples that follow is not closed. For example, Stacey Tovino has floated
neuroimaging exceptionalism. Stacey A. Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging Information: A Case for
Neuro Exceptionalism?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 415, 485 (2007). Further, Mark Rothstein has
discussed the possibility for epigenetic exceptionalism. Mark A. Rothstein, Epigenetic
Exceptionalism, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 733, 735; see also Nicolas P. Terry, Developments in
Genetic and Epigenetic Data Protection in Behavioral and Mental Health Spaces, 33 BEHAV. SCI.
& L. 653 (2015). Finally, some states have safe harbor rules that protect physicians who are
diverted to physician health programs in the case of mental health or substance use disorders. See
generally J. Wesley Boyd & John R. Knight, Ethical and Managerial Considerations Regarding
State Physician Health Programs, 6 J. ADDICT. MED. 243 (2012).
141. HIPAA Privacy Rule and Sharing Information Related to Mental Health, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH
& HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/special/mhguidance.html
[https://perma.cc/U8CU-QW4M].
142. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2016).
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exceptionalism. HIV-AIDS is treated exceptionally compared to other STDs.'4 3
Generally-applicable federal law, such as the Rehabilitation Act1 4 4 and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, apply to claims of discrimination.145 And, of
course, HIPAA applies a data protection baseline.146 However, state laws tend to
provide additional, exceptional data protection such as anonymous testing and
heightened controls on disclosure.14 7
GINA utilizes two models of data protection. First, GINA prohibits
downstream point of use discrimination by employers (Title I) and health
insurers (Title II). However, GINA also prohibits the requiring or (in many cases)
acquiring of genetic information. This is an upstream collection model of
protection and has resulted in large settlements with the EEOC in cases dealing
with unlawful requests for family medical historiesl48 and a landmark $2.2
million jury verdict in the recent "devious defecator" case.149
Less well-known are the Substance Abuse Confidentiality Regulations (often
referred to by their citation, "45 C.F.R. Part 2") promulgated by HHS's
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMSHA). 15 o
These regulations subject federally-assisted programs that maintain alcohol and
drug abuse patient records to downstream disclosure restrictions that are
considerably more stringent than those found in HIPAA. There is also a complex
web of overlapping state mental health and substance abuse laws that further
complicate the picture."' Recently, 45 C.F.R. Part 2 has attracted considerable
attention because of Congressional concerns over the information-sharing costs
143. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 120990 (West 2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
333.5133 (West 2011). Cf MorT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-1014 (West 2016).
144. Rehabilitation Act of 1990 § 504, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012).
145. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
146. See Health Information Privacy Enforcement Examples Involving HIV/AIDS, U.S. DEP'T
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/civilrights/activities/examples/AIDS/hiphiv
/aidscases.html [https://perma.cc/3RFM-YBBF].
147. See, e.g., N.Y PUB. HEALTH LAW ch. 45, art. 27-F (McKinney 2016); see generally Roger
Doughty, Comment, The Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information: Responding to the
Resurgence of Aggressive Public Health Interventions in the Aids Epidemic, 82 CAL. L. REV. 111
(1994).
148. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, Founders Pavilion
Will Pay $370,000 to Settle EEOC Genetic Information Discrimination Lawsuit (Jan. 13, 2014),
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/1-13-14.cfm [https://perma.cc/K9EX-QXAM].
149. Georgia Workers Win $2.2 Min in 'Devious Defecator' Case, REUTERS (June 23, 2015),
http://www.reuters.com/article/verdict-dna-defecator-idUSLINOZ916520150623
[https://perma.cc/7ZAY-Y8V4].
150. Promulgated under the Drug Abuse Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act § 408,
42 U.S.C. § 290ee-3 (2012).
151. See generally RTI INTERNATIONAL, BEHAVIORAL HEALTH DATA EXCHANGE CONSORTIUM:
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it imposes.152 For example, in a letter to a Congressional committee supportive of
the 21st Century Cures Act the Patient Safety Movement urged, "[a]t a minimum,
this problem should be addressed by streamlining the consent process for the
sharing of medical records in integrated care settings."' Reform of Part 2 has
also been targeted in Congressman Tim Murphy's Helping Families in Mental
Health Crisis Act of 2016,154 creating concern among some privacy advocates.'
In January 2017, SAMSHA published a rule that allows a broad "to whom"
consent that it believes will increase the sharing of substance use records through
EHIRs and Health Information Exchanges. The rule also permits health-care data
custodians to share substance abuse data with researchers.5 6
IV. TURBULENCE, DISRUPTION, AND ARBITRAGE IN PRACTICE
A. Professional Health-Care Domain vs. Consumer Domain
In the words of a recent report by the HIT Policy Committee (HITPC), a
federal advisory committee established by the HITECH Act,' "[m]uch of the
health-related information generated today is not regulated by [HIPAA,]""' and
"[t]he exact same health-related information is regulated differently based on the
entity processing the information."l59 As already discussed, the prerequisite for
regulatory turbulence, disruption, and potentially arbitrage is the existence of
differential regulatory models. For the purposes of the present analysis, two
152. See generally Michelle Andrews, Debate Arises Over HHS Plans For Privacy Rules On
Addiction Treatment, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 22, 2016), http://khn.org/news/debate-arises-
over-hhs-plans-for-privacy-rules-on-addiction-treatment [https://perma.cc/XD7T-CYG6].
153. Letter from Jim Bialick, President, Patient Safety Movement Foundation, to Fred
Upton, Chairman, Energy & Commerce Committee, and Frank Pallone, Ranking Member,
Energy & Commerce Committee (Aug. 19, 2015), http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites
/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/I 14/Letters/hr6fPSMF.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J55G-5N5V].
154. Helping Families in Mental Health Crisis Act of 2016, H.R. 2646, 1 14 " Cong. (as passed
by House, Jul. 6, 2015).
155. See, e.g., Kimberly Leonard, Would Mental Health Laws Threaten Privacy and
Patients' Rights?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Aug. 12, 2015),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/08/12/patients-rights-privacy-concerns-
highlighted-in-mental-health-laws [https://perma.cc/9DEB-9C6E]; Peter Sullivan, Dems
Introduce Alternative to GOP's Mental Health Bill, THE HILL (Feb. 2, 2016),
http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/267868-dems-introduce-alternative-to-gop-led-mental-
health-bill [https://perma.cc/SW23-NKT6].
156. Confidentiality of Substance Use Disorder Patient Records, 82 Fed. Reg. 6052 (Jan. 18,
2017) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 2).
157. HITECH Act § 3002,42 U.S.C. 300jj-12 (2012).
158. Health Big Data Recommendations, HEALTH IT POL'Y COMMITTEE PRIVACY & SECURITY
WORKGROUP, 4 (Aug. 2015), http://www.healthit.gov/facas/sites/faca/files/HITPCDraftPSWG_
BigDataTransmittal_2015-08-ll.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NL4-V9BT] [hereinafter Health Big data
Recommendations].
159. Id. at 11.
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regulatory domains are posited: first, a professional health-care domain and
second, a consumer health-care domain.
The professional domain is heavily populated with regulatory models. For
example, it is home to state regulation of health-care providers, custom-based
quality and safety, medical malpractice doctrine, the federal regulation of
prescription drugs and medical devices, state and federal regulation of
professional data curators (HIPAA data custodians), unique "fraud and abuse"
transactional regulations, specialized antitrust scrutiny, and institutional review
board/Common Rule scrutiny of human subjects research. Befitting the country's
most regulated industry, there are considerably more examples that could be
cited.
In contrast, the consumer health-care domain is larger, yet both less
regulated and considerably more indeterminate. For example, OTC
pharmaceuticals are only lightly regulated by FDA,"'o a few issues regarding
consumer platforms may attract some FCC scrutiny, common law products
liability or the Consumer Product and Safety Act may apply to a narrow range of
safety issues, and mobile apps and wearables are either unregulated or currently
benefiting from FDA discretion. Meanwhile, some parts of the domain,
crowdsourcing research models, for example, are barely regulated. Others, such
as data-curation by data subjects, seem very hard to regulate.
Parallel, and potentially exacerbating, regulatory disruptions can occur at the
process level when different regulatory agencies operate in different domains.
For example, HIHS's Office for Civil Rights (HHS-OCR) regulates professional
domain data protection but FTC regulates consumer space. Similarly, FDA
regulates medical devices but the Consumer Product Safety Commission or the
FCC might deal with the consumer domain. A further complication may be
overlapping state and federal laws (e.g., state products liability law overlapping
with FDA or state law or health-care data protection legislation overlapping with
HIPAA privacy or security).
Differentiated regulatory domains can tolerate some turbulence. Further, not
all turbulence develops into disruption. Consider the following episodes of
turbulence between professional and consumer domain. First, Google Glass:
Google introduced (initially only to "Glass Explorers") this augmented reality
wearable in 2013. It was designed and sold as a consumer product.'61
Increasingly, doctors joined the ranks of the "explorers" and soon Glass appeared
160. See Drug Applications for Over-the-Counter (OTC) Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/approv
alapplications/over-the-counterdrugs/default.htm [https://perma.cc/V33W-4JHU].
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in hospitals, used during surgeries, for EHR access and training.16 2 The problem
was that while Glass satisfied the minimal regulatory standards of the consumer
domain, it caused regulatory problems in the professional domain. For example,
it was not HIPAA-compliant, in some implementations it came close to FDA
regulated device territory, and its "stealth" camera tempted marginal collection of
health and personal data.163 Before Glass could become an example of full-on
regulatory disruption, Google announced it would cease selling the device.'6
23andMe, a consumer-facing DNA test kit and analytic service, was
launched in 2007.165 The product's marketing stated that the kits provided health
reports on multiple diseases and conditions, written with enough specificity to
prompt FDA inquiry. 23andMe featured genotyping, not sequencing (although
those technologies are beginning to merge). Notwithstanding that distinction,
here was an example of professional DNA testing migrating into the consumer
health domain.16 6 Apparently, FDA spent four years trying to work with
23andMe before sending the archetypal warning letter informing the company it
was selling an unapproved medical device contrary to the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act.'67 As George Annas and Sherman Elias later noted, "[c]linicians
will be central to helping consumer-patients use genomic information to make
health decisions."'6  As a result they argued, "[a]ny regulatory regime must
recognize this reality by doing more than simply adding the tagline on most
consumer ads for prescription drugs: 'Ask your physician."" 69 When 23andMe
finally had to confront the FDA's concerns, it decided to stop marketing the kit
162. Vala Afshar, How Google Glass Will Transform Healthcare, HUFFINGTON POsT (Oct. 17,
2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/vala-afshar/how-google-glass-will-tra b_60031 00.html
[https://perma.cc/FLE6-EX5V]; Helen Gregg, 5 Hospitals Using, Piloting Google Glass, BECKER'S
HEALTHCARE (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/healthcare-information-
technology/5-hospitals-using-piloting-google-glass.html [https://perma.cc/R8T3-8RD8].
163. See generally Nicolas P. Terry, Chad S. Priest & Paul P. Szotek, Google Glass and Health
Care: Initial Legal and Ethical Questions, 8 J. HEALTH & LIFE Sci. L. 93 (2015).




165. Lisa Baertlein, Google-Backed 23andMe Offers $999 DNA Test, USA TODAY (Nov.
20, 2007), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/webguide/internetlife/2007-11-20-23andme-
launchN.htm [https://perma.cc/K4SC-A7XY].
166. See, e.g., Robert J. Elshire et al., A Robust, Simple Genotyping-by-Sequencing (GBS)
Approach for High Diversity Species, 6 PLOS ONE el 9379 (2011).
167. Letter from Alberto Gutierrez, Director, Office of In vitro Diagnostics and Radiological
Health, to Ann Wojcicki, CEO, 23andMe, Inc. (Nov. 22, 2013),
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters/
2013/ucm376296.htm
[https://perma.cc/SE8F-5C8U]; see generally Matthew Herper, 23andStupid: Is 23andMe Self-
Destructing?, FORBES (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2013/11/25
/23andstupid-is-23andme-self-destructing/ [https://perma.cc/WM3Q-WDQK].
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as a diagnostic tool and changed its reports to generic information rather than
anything approaching diagnostics. 170 Subsequently, FDA approved the
company's marketing of more narrowly focused tests for Bloom syndrome'7' and
autosomal recessive disorders.172 Furthermore, the FDA designation of the tests
as over-the-counter73 led to the obviation of some state law limitations on the
services, making them available across the country.17 4
23andMe was a private initiative at first avoiding and subsequently seeking
regulatory approval. In contrast, the "Blue Button"'7 1 is a federal government
initiative permitting Medicare beneficiaries1 76 and VA patients177 to transfer their
health records. Users may download the data in text, PDF, or Blue Button
formats. The Office of the National Coordinator (ONC) and the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) are targeting similar models as a way of
increasing patient engagement and data liquidity in Stages 2 and 3 of Meaningful
Use.178
170. Brian Fung, Bowing Again to the FDA, 23andMe Stops Issuing Health-related Genetic
Reports, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2013/12/06/bowing-again-to-the-fda-23andme-stops-issuing-health-related-genetic-
reports [https://perma.cc/UT4M-ZLC7].
171. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Permits Marketing of First Direct-to-
Consumer Genetic Carrier Test for Bloom Syndrome (Feb. 19, 2015),
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/tJCM435003
[https://perma.cc/XAV7-8FSA].
172. Andrew Pollack, 23andMe Will Resume Giving Users Health Data, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/21/business/23andme-will-resume-giving-users-health-
data.html [https://perma.cc/JP2T-26CU]. FDA continues to investigate other direct-consumer
genetic tests. See, e.g., Letter from James L. Woods, Deputy Director Patient Safety and Product
Quality, Office of In Vitro Diagnostics and Radiological Health, to Rajasingam S. Jeyendran, DNA-
Cardiocheck, Inc. (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/ResourcesforYou
/Industry/UCM471784.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4NP-84JK].
173. Letter from Courtney H. Lias, Director, Division of Chemistry and Toxicology Devices,
Office of In Vitro Diagnostics and Radiological Health, to Kathy Hibbs, Chief Legal and
Regulatory Officer, 23andMe, Inc. (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cdrh-docs
/pdfl4/denl40044.pdf [https://perma.cc/A86T-7JWU].
174. Press Release, 23andMe, 23andMe Genetic Service Now Fully Accessible to Customers in
New York and Maryland (Dec. 4, 2015), http://mediacenter.23andme.com/?p=2084
[https://perma.cc/RMG4-FERN].
175. About Blue Button, HEALTHIT.GOv, http://www.healthit.gov/patients-families/blue-
button/about-blue-button [https://perma.cc/G8C5-626J].
176. Download Claims with Medicare's Blue Button, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.medicare.gov/manage-your-health/blue-button/medicare-blue-button.html
[https://perma.cc/44LQ-SKGV].
177. The My HealtheVet Community, U.S. DEP'T VETERANS AFF.,
https://www.myhealth.va.gov/mhv-portal-web/mhv-community [https://perma.cc/G2GZ-7L7L].
178. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Electronic Health Record Incentive Program-
Stage 2, 77 Fed. Reg. 53,968, 53,973 (Sept. 4, 2012) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 413,
and 495). For more detail see Eligible Professional, Meaningful Use Core Measures, Measure
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What do we learn from these three examples of regulatory turbulence? Both
Google Glass and 23andMe were temporary phenomena. The former was a
consumer domain product that caused some turbulence in the professional space
but which was withdrawn from the market before disruption could occur (or
HIPAA indeterminacy or FDA device regulation issues were resolved). The latter
was the inverse; a professional domain technology sold into consumer space.
23andMe likely was subject to professional domain medical device regulation. It
caused turbulence at a process level because its developer seemingly was
oblivious to or unmindful of FDA regulations. As a result, for several years there
was accidental disruption until regulator-regulatee information costs equalized.
Once 23andMe was forced to confront the FDA's concerns, it decided to stop
marketing the kit as diagnostic.
Only the last of these three examples exhibits a transition from turbulence to
disruption. The entirely well meaning, patient-autonomy-respecting Blue Button
program has a seriously disruptive effect. It takes HIPAA-protected data and,
with a single click from the data subject, moves it into an almost completely
unprotected domain. This is a model now being repeated by Stage 3 of
Meaningful Use, which adds the option of an application programming interface
(API) linkage between a provider's EHR and a patient's app.179 It could be
argued that there is simply no data protection issue when the data subject holds
the data. However, the data likely implicates persons other than the data subject
(such as the subject's family members) and so any data compromise is neither
benign nor intrinsically limited. Further, there is disruption in fact and substantial
potential for confusion when the "same" data are subject to both professional
domain regulation (professional curation) and consumer domain-regulation-lite
(personal curation). Clicking the Blue Button strips data protection from clinical
data. Major questions arise as to how to adequately warn the data subject at the
point of conversion and whether policymakers can appropriately remodel data
subjects' expectations and responsibilities.
B. Example One: Big Data
Observations as to either the sectoral limitations of U.S. data protection or
the rise of commercial data brokers are hardly novel. A decade ago, Dan Solove
and Chris Hoofnagle noted, "[a]lthough most industrialized nations have
comprehensive data protection laws, the United States has maintained a sectoral
approach where certain industries are covered and others are not. In particular,
emerging companies known as 'commercial data brokers' have frequently
179. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Electronic Health Record Incentive Program-Stage 3
and Modifications to Meaningful Use in 2015 Through 2017, 80 Fed. Reg. 62,762 (Oct. 16, 2015);
42 C.F.R. § 495.24 (2016).
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slipped through the cracks of U.S. privacy law."'s Solove and Hoofnagle did not
use the terms disruption or arbitrage but probably had something similar in mind
when stating, "[m]any companies brokering in data have found ways to avoid
being regulated by [FCRA]."'"' More recently, Kate Crawford and Jason Schultz
observed, "[n]ot only does Big Data's use have the potential to circumvent
existing antidiscrimination regulations, but it may also lead to privacy breaches
in health care.. ."182
As reported by FTC:
[D]ata brokers. . . purchase information about individuals from wide-
ranging commercial sources. For example, the data brokers obtain
detailed, transaction-specific data about purchases from retailers and
catalog companies. Such information can include the types of purchases
(e.g., high-end shoes, natural food, toothpaste, items related to
disabilities or orthopedic conditions), the dollar amount of the purchase,
the date of the purchase, and the type of payment used.183
In most cases, data brokers will not find dealing directly with HIPAA
covered entities (or their business associates) to be a good source of clinical data.
Generally, HIPAA entities would be unable to supply clinical data without data
subject (patient) authorization,'84 a heightened form of consent. Or, if HIPAA
entities agree to the broker's request for a "limited data set," the disclosure would
be restricted to "research" only processing and subject to a re-identification-
limiting data use agreement.85
Denied access to most of the health-care "deep web," 86 data brokers
therefore construct clinical data "proxies" from other data pools. These pools,
like the public records and other databases they mine, exist outside of HIPAA-
protected space. They do not completely ignore data that has been subject to
HIPAA protection. For example, they may acquire de-identified data; HIPAA
data that have been de-identified are no longer subject to HIPAA. 8'7 They may
also acquire HIPAA data that have been legally shared with public health
authorities,'18  who subsequently made anonymized or de-identified data sets
180. Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy Protection, 2006 U.
ILL. L. REv. 357, 357 (2006).
181. Id. at 359.
182. Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward A Framework to
Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REv. 93, 99 (2014).
183. Data Brokers, supra note 3, at 13.
184. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508 (2016).
185. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514 (2016).
186. See generally Jose Pagliery, The Deep Web You Don't Know About, CNN (Mar. 10, 2014),
http://money.cnn.com/2014/03/10/technology/deep-web/index.html [https://perma.cc/DJP9-4YG9].
187. See supra text accompanying note 90 et seq.








As discussed elsewhere,'9 0 these data are supplemented by medical-inflected
data, what McKinsey refers to as "[p]atient behavior and sentiment data that
describe patient activities and preferences, both inside and outside the healthcare
context."l9' These data are culled from social media interactions, retail stores,
web trackers, online transactions, mobile phone location trackers, fitness
wearables, and so on. Data brokers subsequently leverage their sophisticated
algorithms and the breadth of their triangulation databases to re-identify the
data.192
Increasingly, our everyday interactions will trigger unrealized or
unconsented collection of data about us from Internet of Things devices,
including our location and physical, even medical, condition. As pointed out by
Elizabeth Pike, another likely data pool is the "non-consensual collection and use
of genetic material."'93 Pike identifies regulatory disruption because "[i]n many
ways, commercial endeavors are less heavily regulated than federally funded
research endeavors outside the Common Rule's reach. And commercial entities
are unlikely to be "covered entities" subject to HIPAA's Privacy Rule."'94
These disparate, essentially unregulated data pools make possible the
following claim by one major data broker:
We have one of the largest and most comprehensive collections of
healthcare information in the world, spanning sales, prescription and
promotional data, medical claims, electronic medical records and social
media. Our scaled and growing data set, containing over 10 petabytes of
unique data, includes over 85% of the world's prescriptions by sales
revenue and approximately 400 million comprehensive, longitudinal,
anonymous patient records. We standardize, organize, structure and
integrate this data by applying our sophisticated analytics and
leveraging our global technology infrastructure to help our clients run
their organizations more efficiently and make better decisions to
improve their operational and financial performance.'9 5
189. See, e.g., Sean Hooley & Latanya Sweeney, Survey Of Publicly Available State Health
Databases, HARV. U. 3 (2013), http://dataprivacylab.org/projects/50states/1 075-1 .pdf
[https://perma.cc/P8KE-2NDK].
190. See Nicolas P. Terry, Big Data Proxies and Health Privacy Exceptionalism, 24 HEALTH
MATRrx 65, 84-87 (2014).
191. Peter Groves et al., The 'Big Data'Revolution in Healthcare, MCKINSEY & Co. 3 (Jan.
2013), http://www.pharmatalents.es/assets/files/BigDataRevolution.pdf [https://perma.cc/RG3E-
2JQ5].
192. See generally Terry, supra note 140.
193. Elizabeth R. Pike, Securing Sequences: Ensuring Adequate Protections for Genetic
Samples in the Age ofBig Data, 37 CARDOzo L. REv. 1977, 1980 (2015).
194. Id. at 2007 (references omitted).
195. Registration Statement under the Securities Act of 1933 (Form S-1), IMS HEALTH
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The regulatory disruption is clear and arbitrage highly likely. Data brokers,
generally shut out of protected health-care data, are able to create proxies for
those data in a lightly regulated HIIPAA-free zone. Crawford and Schultz go
further, noting that the "predictive privacy harms" caused by big data are such
that traditional upstream and downstream data protection models ("collection,
processing and disclosure") can be circumvented.'96
Medically inflected data collected from, say, social media, apps, and retail
stores can quickly result in highly targeted advertising. The predictive analytics
at the root of big data "learns from experience (data) to predict the future
behavior of individuals in order to drive better decisions."' Smith v. Facebook,
Inc.,198 a recently filed class action against the social media company and various
health-care providers offers insight into how such systems work. According to
the complaint, the web sites of various health-care providers include "referrer"
headers and third-party tracking "cookies" that allow Facebook to link search
requests (e.g., stomach cancer diagnosis) to its own users. These search requests,
coupled with other data such as "like" activity, allegedly enabled Facebook to
create health-related profiles of its users against which it could sell health-related
advertising specifically targeted at them. Indeed, the world's largest social media
platform collects ninety-eight personal data points about their users for the
purpose of targeting advertising.'99 These include all manner of personal and
financial information, including parental status and whether pregnant.20
Increasingly, health scoring and other data segmentation carries the threat of
discrimination. At first sight, wellness firms that mine data about employees and
then "nudge" them into healthier pursuits seem relatively benign. However, there
are considerable risks of these data being exposed to employers or their aggregate
nature being undermined by small populations, enabling identification.20 '
Health data acquired by data brokers can also be looped back into the health-
care space for discriminatory purposes. As is well known, the ACA prohibits pre-
HOLDINGS, INC. (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data
/1595262/000119312514000659/d628679ds1.htm [https://perma.cc/G385-EFVF].
196. Crawford & Schultz, supra note 182, at 106.
197. ERIC SIEGEL, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS: THE POWER TO PREDICT WHO WILL CLICK, Buy, LIE,
OR DIE 11 (2013).
198. Complaint, Smith v. Facebook, Inc., 2016 WL 1042966 (N.D.Cal.) (5:16-cv-01282) (filed
Mar. 15, 2016).
199. Caitlin Dewey, 98 Personal Data Points That Facebook Uses to Target Ads to You, WASH.
POST, (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2016/08/19/98-
personal-data-points-that-facebook-uses-to-target-ads-to-you/ [https://perma.cc/75Y9-APB5].
200. Id.
201. See Rachel Emma Silverman, Bosses Tap Outside Firms to Predict Which Workers Might
Get Sick, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 17, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/bosses-hamess-big-data-to-
predict-which-workers-might-get-sick-1455664940 [https://perma.cc/WFM3-RPFF]; Valentina
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existing condition exclusions, discriminatory premium rates, and generally
requires guaranteed issue.202 Guaranteed issue and related regulations generally
do not apply to life insurers who are customers for big data proxies. Even more
troubling are reports of health insurers who use data-mined prescription drug data
to continue their discrimination against high cost patients.2 03 For example, big
data analytics permit insurers to predict the health conditions of those in their risk
pools. They could then move drugs associated with patients with expensive
chronic conditions to high cost-sharing tiers in the hope of discouraging those
patients from applying for coverage.2" As a result, unregulated big data has the
potential to frustrate some of the mainstay policies of our health-care system.
C. Example. Two: Mobile Health Data
The defining characteristic of mobile health is that it is patient-facing.
Unlike most examples of digital health, patients or pre-patients interact directly
with mobile health hardware and software, frequently without the direct
involvement of conventional health-care providers. Most of these relationships
form and interactions occur in a consumer rather than a professional space. As a
result, serious turbulence, even regulatory disruption, can occur. In some ways,
emerging mobile health-care services mirror the Uber-Lyft model. Like those car
services, mobile health steps around bureaucracy-laden incumbents that have
been slow to adopt information technologies, reform their guilds, modernize their
financing, or offer coherent alternatives to inconvenient centralized locations.
Consequently, mobile health, a combination of mobile health apps, wearable
devices, and the rapidly iterating Internet of Health Things, suggest some health-
care business disruption. Specifically, mobile health promises personalized care,
improved convenience, and lower cost.
Of course, the HIPAA privacy and security rules apply to traditional health-
care providers such as doctors and hospitals. Therefore, if a hospital or health
insurer (or a business associate) builds a patient portal app to provide access to
EHR or claims information, HIPAA likely applies. However, the vast majority of
health apps are not curated, sold or implemented by HIPAA "covered entities";
they are built by technology companies and sold through app stores. As a result,
202. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1201, 124 Stat.
119, 154-61 (2010).
203. See, e.g., Jordan Robertson, The Pitfalls of Health-Care Companies' Addiction to Big
Data, BNA BLOOMBERG HEALTH IT L. & INDUSTRY REP. (Sept. 23, 2015),
http://news.bna.com/hiln/HILNWB/split display.adp?fedfid=76390826&vname=hitrbulallissues&j
d=a0h3f2f8b0&split-0 [https://perma.cc/DQL6-2YB4].
204. Douglas B. Jacobs & Benjamin D. Sommers, Using Drugs to Discriminate - Adverse
Selection in the Insurance Marketplace, 372 NEw ENG. J. MED. 399 (2015); see also Julie Appleby,
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much of the fitness and health data collected by mobile apps and wearables have
very thin legal protection. ONC recognized this problem in a 2016 report to
Congress concluding "Wearable fitness trackers, health social media, and mobile
health apps are premised on the idea of consumer engagement. However, our
laws and regulations have not kept pace with these new technologies."205
This also seems to be the case with mobile platform health data aggregators
and APIs, such as those offered by Apple with its "Health" app, HealthKit
SDK,2 06 and "CareKit" framework.207 Platform developers appear to take the
position that their apps do not access any HIPAA-protected data but merely act
as traffic cops working at the direction of the data subject. Take as an example a
patient who uses a tracker to collect health data and who wants to share that with
his or her health-care provider's patient portal app. The sharing is facilitated
through the mobile platform health app. If that app is only opening and closing
doors at the instructions of the patient then, the argument is made, the platform
app is not "touching" any HIPAA data.208
Tens of thousands of mobile health apps are now collecting vast quantities of
health-care data. However, the majority of these apps are operating in the
HIPAA-free zone with little or no regulation as to how they should share data
with third parties or what the security is expected of any off-device data storage.
Of course, some app/wearable developers (no doubt with an eye on the growing
market for "wellness" products being promoted or required by insurers and
employers) are beginning to advertise HIPAA-compliance.209
The mobile health app space is a perfect breeding ground for regulatory
disruption and arbitrage. The professional domain is highly regulated by HIPAA
205. Examining Oversight of the Privacy & Security of Health Data Collected by Entities Not
Regulated by HIPAA, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. 32 (June 2016),
https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/non-coveredentities reportjunel 7_2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4JV7-8DDT] [hereinafter Health Data Collected by Entities Not Regulated by
HIP4A].
206. Develop Health and Fitness Apps that Work Together, APPLE, INC.,
https://developer.apple.com/healthkit [https://perma.cc/7L9A-QG27].
207. Press Release, Apple, Inc., Apple Advances Health Apps with CareKit: New Software
Framework Helps Developers Empower People to Take a More Active Role in their Health (Mar.
21, 2016), http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2016/03/21 Apple-Advances-Health-Apps-with-
CareKit.html [https://perma.cc/26SQ-NLT5].
208. See Mark Sullivan, While Apple HealthKit Works out Bugs, Cleveland Clinic Uses
Microsoft's HealthVault Platform to Reach Remote Patients, VENTUREBEAT (Sept. 23, 2014),
http://venturebeat.com/2014/09/23/while-apple-healthkit-works-out-bugs-cleveland-clinic-uses-
microsofts-healthvault-platform-to-reach-remote-patients [https://perma.cc/KMM3-AHJU].
209. See Press Release, Fitbit, Inc., Fitbit Extends Corporate Wellness Offering with HIPAA
Compliant Capabilities (Sept. 16, 2015),
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20150916005371/en/#.VgAIX7SRq-I
[https://perma.cc/B6FN-2EFA] ("Our compliance with HIPAA safeguards formalizes this
commitment, and, more importantly, it creates opportunities for more effective relationships with
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but the consumer domain is either unregulated or less regulated (limited to ab
initio app store210 or ex post facto FTC2 11 regulation). Disruption and arbitrage in
this mobile space are ongoing, as can be seen from the dysfunctional state of
medical device regulation.212 Indeed, the current regulatory status of these
devices is sufficiently complicated that HHS-OCR, FTC, and FDA have felt
compelled to publish an interactive tool in attempt to guide app developers
through the regulatory confusion.213
Privacy and security issues are mounting.214 Many medical apps have
unsatisfactory data privacy policies,2 15 and one recent study found "that on
average 87.7% of Android devices are exposed to at least one of [eleven] known
critical vulnerabilities. .. "216 More pointedly, Huckvale and colleagues recently
examined the privacy and security risks of mobile health apps that had been
accredited (for clinical safety) by the English National Health Service (NHS)
Health Apps Library. Overall, the study found a low level of encryption of user
data at rest (on the device) or in motion and a lack of transparency in privacy
policies.2 17 In a 2016 report funded by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of
Canada, Hilts and colleagues documented how fitness trackers (Apple's Watch
aside) emitted persistent unique identifiers that could enable tracking of users and
that several also had other basic security flaws, including a failure to encrypt data
in motion.218
210. App Store Review Guidelines, APPLE, INC., https://developer.apple.com/app-
store/review/guidelines [https://perma.cc/CDB8-Q2F4].
211. See, e.g., LabMD, Inc., FTC No. 102-3099 (2016), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement
/cases-proceedings/102-3099/labmd-inc-matter [https://perma.cc/BR4S-Z6AM].
212. See generally Nathan Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1173
(2014).
213. Mobile Health Apps Interactive Tool, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/business-center/guidance/mobile-health-apps-interactive-tool [https://perma.cc/QV96-
C7EH].
214. See generally Nicolas Terry, Hall Render Professor of Law & Executive Director, Hall
Center for Law and Health, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law, Opening
Remarks for House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee Hearing on Health Care Apps
(July 13, 2016), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/WF/IF17/20160713/105197/HHRG-114-IFl7-
Wstate-TerryN-20160713.pdf [https://perma.cc/HVF2-K29J]; Disrupter Series: Health Care Apps:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, 114" Cong. (Jul. 13, 2016), https://energycommerce.house.gov/hearings-and-
votes/hearings/disrupter-series-health-care-apps [https://perma.cc/3T2A-XNRU].
215. Sarah R. Blenner, Melanie Killmer, Adam J. Rouse, Nadia Daneshvar, Curry Williams &
Lori B. Andrews, Privacy Policies of Android Diabetes Apps and Sharing of Health Information,
315 JAMA 1051 (2016).
216. Daniel R. Thomas et al., Security Metrics for the Android Ecosystem, U. CAM BRIDGE (Oct.
12, 2015), https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~drt24/papers/spsm-scoring.pdf [https://perma.cc/TG3N-
LJBW].
217. Kit Huckvale et al., Unaddressed Privacy Risks in Accredited Health and Wellness Apps: A
Cross-Sectional Systematic Assessment, 13 B.M.C. MED. 1 (2015).
218. Andrew Hilts et al., EVERY STEP You FAKE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FITNESS
TRACKER PRIVACY AND SECURITY, OPEN EFFECT, (Feb. 2016), https://openeffect.ca/reports
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Finally, the patient-facing, patient-data curating aspects of mobile health
apps and their wearable fellow-travelers raise another, much more fundamental
issue (and one not necessarily unique to health-care data). Data protection models
and their implementation have been built around institutional curation of people's
data and carve-outs for other institutions interested in that data. Personal or self-
curation enabled by personal technologies presents an asymmetric question,
whether institutions can access that data under conditions set by data subjects.2 19
That question was at the root of the 2016 stand-off between Apple and the FBI
over access to data encrypted on an iPhone.220 If technology continues to outstrip
regulation, an open question is whether pre-patients and patients will combat
regulatory disruption by moving their data to the secure enclaves221 they control
and thereafter decide themselves if, how, and when to share data with institutions
whose services they wish to engage. At one level this technological and
conceptual shift will protect health-care data and reduce regulatory arbitrage. At
another, however, it will cripple appropriate data sharing between patients and
providers or researchers and sadly signal policymakers' inability to address the
level of data protection desired by consumers.
V. DATA PROTECTION VERSUS DATA LIQUIDITY
Calls for increased data liquidity to further fuel the information society are
hardly new. In the health-care domain, they frequently translate into public goods
arguments. Further, in the traditional health-care space, there are some critically
important policy initiatives that often are cast as at odds with existing HIPAA
protections, let alone any increased upstream data protection. Currently, these
include clinical interoperability and medical research.
A. Clinical Interoperability
Interoperability began with a plan announced by President Bush in 2004 "to
ensure that most Americans have electronic health records within the next 10
years."2 22 Moving from paper to electronic records merely substitutes electronic
/EveryStep YouFake.pdf [https://perma.cc/AUQ4-D74U].
219. See generally Adrian Groper, Apple and the 3 Kinds of Privacy Policies, HEALTH CARE
BLOG (Feb 22, 2016), http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2016/02/22/apple-and-the-3-kinds-of-
privacy-policies [https://perma.cc/ZVJ5-27G8].
220. See generally Brian Barrett, The Apple-FBI Battle Is Over But The New Crypto Wars Have
Just Begun, WIRED (March 30, 2016), http://www.wired.com/2016/03/apple-fbi-battle-crypto-wars-
just-begun/ [https://perma.cc/2F8A-RN8B]; Kim Zetter, Apple's FBI Battle Is Complicated. Here's
What's Really Going On, WIRED (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.wired.com/2016/02/apples-fbi-battle-
is-complicated-heres-whats-really-going-on/ [https://perma.cc/CYF9-L2LB].
221. See generally iOS Security: iOS 9.0 or Later, APPLE, INC. (Sept. 2015),
https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOSSecurityGuide.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VVE-DZ2U].
222. Transforming Health Care: The President's Health Information Technology Plan, WHITE
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solos for their file room predecessors. Thus, that 10-year plan rotated around the
implementation of interoperable records. However, by 2009 "information
systems in more than 90% of U.S. hospitals [did] not even meet the requirement
for a basic electronic-records system."223 Not surprisingly, therefore, the federal
government's Meaningful Use subsidy program,224 introduced by the HITECH
Act, made interoperability a major goal,2 25 albeit one that has proven particularly
difficult to execute.226
The search for the magic bullet that will make clinical data more liquid
within professional health-care space has implicated HIPAA privacy rules.
Specifically, there are concerns that rigorous downstream data protection models
impede data sharing. For example, a 2015 ONC report found that "privacy and
security laws are cited in circumstances in which they do not in fact impose
restrictions" such as when "providers . . . cite the HIPAA Privacy Rule as a
reason for denying the exchange of electronic protected health information for
treatment purposes, when the Rule specifically permits such disclosures."227
In its interoperability roadmap, ONC has laid out a ten-year plan for
converting U.S. health care into a truly interoperable learning
22 8 health-care
system.2 29 Throughout, the report stresses that data protection will not suffer: "It
is essential to maintain public trust that health information is safe and secure. To
better establish and maintain that trust, stakeholders will strive to ensure that
appropriate, strong and effective safeguards for electronic health information are
in place as interoperability increases across the industry."
230
Interestingly, the report also calls on stakeholders to "support greater
whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/technology/economic_policy
2 0 04O 4 /chap3.html
[https://perma.cc/2U68-DXS9].
223. Ashish K. Jha et al., Use of Electronic Health Records in U.S. Hospitals, 360 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1628, 1634 (2009).
224. Electronic Health Records (EHR) Incentive Programs, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-GuidanceLegislation/EHRIncenftivePrograms/index.html
[https://perma.cc/VVK8-82GJ].
225. See Deth Sao et al., Interoperable Electronic Health Care Record: A Case for Adoption of
a National Standard to Stem the Ongoing Health Care Crisis, 34 J. LEGAL MED. 55 (2013).
226. See Terry, supra note 61, at 164-68.
227. Office of the Nat'l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., Report on Health Information
Blocking, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. 16 (Apr. 2015),
https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/reports/infoblocking_040915.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3JNE-HJPTJ [hereinafter Report on Health Information Blocking].
228. See generally The Learning Healthcare System: Workshop Summary, INST. MED.
(LeighAnne Olsen et al. eds. 2007) https://www.nap.edu/catalog/11903/the-leaming-healthcare-
system-workshop-summary-iom-roundtable-on-evidence [https://perma.cc/5JVB-SCYL].
229. Office of the Nat'l Coordinator for Health Info. Tech., Connecting Health and Care for the
Nation: A Shared Nationwide Interoperability Roadmap, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Oct.
2015), https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/hie-interoperability/nationwide-interoperability-
roadmap-final-version-1 .0.pdf [https://perma.cc/34M4-6AA2].
230. Id. at xiv.
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transparency for individuals regarding the business practices of entities that use
their data, particularly those that are not covered by the HIPAA Privacy and
Security Rules, while considering the preferences of individuals."23 1 This
statement reads as a somewhat dejected admission that a dysfunctional regulatory
system increasingly is hopeful of leveraging corporate stakeholder empathy to
influence those they do business with to respect health-care data protection.
Due to the pressure to increase data interoperability and exchange,
policymakers will continue to embrace calls to reduce some of the exceptional
protections granted health-care data. The most likely initial casualty is the
additional exceptional protections currently granted behavioral health records.232
Although SAMSHA delivered on its promise to deliver an updated draft
regulation within the next eighteen months,233 its Congressional critics remain
unimpressed.234
In the next few years, the increasingly difficult task for policymakers will be
to distinguish between: first, the "noise" of overstating HIPAA barriers, second,
attempts to use the goal of enhanced interoperability as a straw man designed to
increase commercial expropriation of clinical data and third, genuine, nuanced
policy collisions that require resolution (including data protection deprecation).
B. Medical and Population Health Research
Claims on clinical and medically inflected and health-determining data for
research purposes are also increasing. Much of the research is taking place within
clinical spaces. Of particular relevance to issues of data regulation, health-care
providers claim that the growing field of outcomes research is covered by
HIPAA's permitted use exception for "health care operations"235 Other research
involves big data analytics (examples include the President's Precision Medicine
Initiative236 and the NIH's Big Data to Knowledge program237) and typically uses
de-identified clinical data or an identified "limited data set" subject to a data use
231. Id.
232. See supra text accompanying note 150 et seq.
233. See supra text accompanying note 150.
234. "This regulations [sic] continues the redundant multiple-step process that makes it a huge
burden for patients, providers, and health care professionals that could make it difficult for a
provider to get relevant information quickly and it is a barrier to integrated care." David Pittman,
Senate HELP Alters Its Health IT Draft, POLITICO (Feb. 8, 2016),
http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morning-ehealth/2016/02/senate-help-alters-its-health-it-draft-
212591 [https://perma.cc/8J9V-TYL5] (quoting email from office of Rep. Murphy).
235. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506 (2016).
236. The Precision Medicine Initiative, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/precision-
medicine [https://perma.cc/BE9M-RVM7].
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agreement.2 38 As noted by Barbara Evans, "[a] major challenge in twenty-first
century privacy law and research ethics will be to come to terms with the
inherently collective nature of knowledge generation in a world where large-scale
informational research is set to play a more prominent role." 2 39 Jane Bambauer
goes further, arguing that, because HIPAA "attempt[s] to anticipate and account
for every public policy override, and set an otherwise inflexible rule of
nondisclosure[,]" its "privacy provisions have had perverse effects on access to
critical research data, quality of care, and overall public health."240
That tension between data protection and responsible research will only
increase. Furthermore, technology continually chisels away at the professional-
consumer health-care space divide. For example, the IOM has recommended that
some social and economic determinants of health should be recorded in EHRs,2 41
adding social media to clinical data shows promise,242 and, increasingly, clinical
research is occurring outside of recognized professional spaces using
crowdsourcing or mobile apps such as those built around Apple's ResearchKit.24
3
C. Refuting the Binary
Arguments about the negative impact of data protection on clinical
interoperability, medical research, or positive disruption suffer from one
consistent shortcoming. They tend to posit unsupportable, simplistic binaries,
painting "privacy" as oppositional to innovation or progress. There are several
flaws underpinning this "all or nothing" position.
First, data protection rules that impact research or other data sharing, while
occasionally deliberately obstructive, often are misinterpreted or used perversely
to create barriers. In 2010 the President's Council of Advisors on Science and
Technology noted how "The complex mandates of both HIPAA and state laws
and regulations leads organizations to equate protection to sequestration, with
little or no provision for either access based on roles . . . or for legitimate
secondary uses of data . . . although HIPAA itself actually does allow disclosures
in many such cases."2" In the intervening years HHS-OCR, which is charged
238. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514 (2016).
239. Barbara J. Evans, Much Ado About Data Ownership, 25 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 69, 76 (2011).
240. Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REv. 57, 114 (2014).
241. Nancy E. Adler & William W. Stead, Patients in Context - EHR Capture of Social and
Behavioral Determinants ofHealth, 372 NEw ENG. J. MED. 698 (2015).
242. See, e.g., Kevin A. Padrez et al., Linking Social Media and Medical Record Data: A Study
of Adults Presenting to an Academic, Urban Emergency Dep't, 25 BMJ QUALITY & SAFETY 414
(2016).
243. See, e.g., Press Release, Apple, Inc., Apple Announces New ResearchKit Studies for
Autism, Epilepsy & Melanoma (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2015/10/15Apple-
Announces-New-ResearchKit-Studies-for-Autism-Epilepsy-Melanoma.html
[https://perma.cc/6KG8-LBXF].
244. President's Council of Advisors on Sci. & Tech., Report to the President Realizing the
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with HIPAA enforcement, has repeatedly issued guidance reminding
stakeholders that HIPAA allows sharing of PHI between provider and patient245
and between providers.246 Equally, Congress2 47 and ONC2 48 have been critical of
any attempts providers have made to use HIPAA as a barrier for intentional non-
sharing, usually referred to as "information blocking." Ironically, medically-
inflected data (the health-care data collected and processed outside of HIPAA
protection) is likely more liquid than data held by traditional health-care
providers. However, as technologies improve and both providers and patients
become better educated about data sharing within a protected environment, that
should change.
Second, data protection is contextual and the level of protection should be
calibrated against particular data types, intended uses, and the commercial
ambitions of data custodians. With regard to the last, and as noted by the FTC:
Organizations have used big data to predict life expectancy, genetic
predisposition to disease, likelihood of hospital readmission, and likelihood of
adherence to a treatment plan in order to tailor medical treatment to an
individual's characteristics. This, in turn, has helped health-care providers avoid
one-size-fits-all treatments and lower overall health-care costs by reducing
readmissions. Ultimately, data sets with richer and more complete data should
allow medical practitioners more effectively to perform "precision medicine," an
approach for disease treatment and prevention that considers individual
variability in genes, environment, and lifestyle.2 49
In contrast, the commercial use of sensitive personal-health-care or
medically-inflected data exported from or created outside of the health-care space
impacts quite different policy questions. When data are being used by providers
for, say, clinical outcomes research, restrictive rules are less called for so long as
Full Potential of Health Information Technology to Improve Healthcare for Americans: The
Path Forward, EXECUTIVE OFFICE PRESIDENT 47 (Dec. 2010),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/pcast-health-it-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TCG3-TQQ7].
245. See, e.g., Individuals' Right under HIPAA to Access Their Health Information 45 CFR §
164.524, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-
professionals/privacy/guidance/access/index.html [https://perma.cc/KY6C-JMDU].
246. Does the HIPAA Privacy Rule Permit a Doctor Laboratory, or Other Health Care
Provider to Share Patient Health Information for Treatment Purposes by Fax, E-mail, or Over the
Phone?, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-
professionals/faq/482/does-hipaa-permit-a-doctor-to-share-patient-information-for-treatment-over-
the-phone/index.html [https://perma.cc/WTM9-75A2].
247. See, e.g., 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 4004, 130 Stat. 1033, 1176-80
(2016) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-52).
248. See, e.g., Report on Health Information Blocking, supra note 227, at 11-14.
249. Big Data: A Tool for Inclusion or Exclusion? Understanding the Issues, FED. TRADE
COMMISSIoN 7 (Jan. 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/big-data-tool-
inclusion-or-exclusion-understanding-issues/160106big-data-rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/WR4N-
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the data are used for the stated purpose and kept within the clinical domain.
Third, "privacy" is not a single concept but rather is descriptive of a broad
array of upstream and downstream protective models. Take a recent opinion
piece by David Agus, which at first sight seemed to be adopting the anti-HIPAA
rhetoric of medical research trumping privacy when he argued: "Patients
understandably don't want their acquaintances and employers to know all their
private health information. But we cannot let these fears suppress the powerful
insights medical data can offer us."250 Yet, elsewhere in the piece, he argued for
increased data encryption and other security, careful protection against health-
care data-driven discrimination and generally seemed to be arguing for the
sharing of de-identified information.
The trick is that we can have both research and data protection. Similarly,
data market disruption or mobile health disruption can drive progress in health
care without exposing patient's data to exploitation. Neither need endanger
properly calibrated health-care data protection.
VI. REGULATORY RESPONSES TO DISRUPTION AND ARBITRAGE
In the face of regulatory disruption and arbitrage, it should be no surprise
that additional data protection is required to safeguard health-care information
that resides outside of traditional, highly regulated spaces. Policymakers must
address considerations of timing and approach together with the question of
whether they need to add additional protections to continue the tradition of
exceptionalism. First, however, it is worth considering whether to deal with the
issue by attacking disruption, rather than by better regulating the disrupted state.
A. Is Disruption Worth the Trouble?
Is it possible to put a positive spin on disruption? Returning once again to
the analogy of mobile health and ride-hailing apps, there seems little doubt that
the traditional taxi industry presents with serious anti-competitive properties: a
guild mentality, non-market limitations on the number of market participants via
medallions, and agency capture to name just a few.25' Is there an argument to be
made that regulatory disruption does what policymakers often fail to do; to take a
clean-sheet look at the regulation of innovative businesses rather than simply
250. David B. Agus, Give Up Your Data to Cure Disease, N.Y. TiMEs (Feb. 6, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/07/opinion/sunday/give-up-your-data-to-cure-disease.html
[https://perma.cc/KZ9M-YW4J]
251. See generally Rohin Dhar, The Tyranny of the Taxi Medallions, PRICECONOMICS (Apr. 10,
2013), http://blog.priceonomics.com/post/47636506327/the-tyranny-of-the-taxi-medallions
[https://perma.cc/39FZ-UR9E]; Jason Snead, Taxicab Medallion Systems: Time for a Change,
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apply or add to the sedimentary layers of outdated laws?
Of course, health care makes the taxi industry look like a candidate for a
Nobel Prize in economics. Indeed, there is nothing novel about the observation
that health care fails to obey most market norms.25 2 Equally, it is well known that
at various times physicians, hospital administrators,253 and insurerS254 have held
market-controlling positions. Examples are legion and regulators, such as the
FTC, do rail against some of the worst market abuses. For example, in North
Carolina State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. F.TC., Justice Kennedy denied
application of state antitrust immunity when government "abandon[s] markets to
the unsupervised control of active market participants, whether trade associations
or hybrid agencies."255
For every attempt to limit, say, guild power, there are defeats elsewhere,
however. For instance, the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division
of the U.S. Department have been sharply critical of health care's "medallion"
systems such as state requirements for Certificates of Need (CON): "CON laws
raise considerable competitive concerns and generally do not appear to have
achieved their intended benefits for health care consumers. For these reasons, the
Agencies historically have suggested that states consider repeal or retrenchment
of their CON laws."2 56 Yet, most courts seem unimpressed by legal challenges to
these relics of 1970s centralized planning.2 57
Are, therefore, big data and mobile health disruptions positives? After all,
entrenched stakeholders (incumbents) seem to have little interest in positively
reforming data protection regimes. This is not always because of a genuine
commitment to patient privacy. Rather, health-care stakeholders frequently view
patient data as proprietary and will use the excuse of privacy to keep such
valuable assets close. "Disruption as laboratory" is also a tempting model
because of the current tension between data protection and data liquidity. In the
words of Cisco executive Shanti Gidwani, "Disruptive is a good thing. . . It
moves us to be transformational and innovative."2 58
252. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics ofMedical Care, 53 AM. ECON.
REv. 941 (1963).
253. See, e.g., PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICNE (1982).
254. See, e.g., CHIusTY FORD CHAPIN, ENSURING AMERICA'S HEALTH, THE PUBLIC CREATION OF
THE CORPORATE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (2015).
255. 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1117 (2015).
256. Fed. Trade Comm'n & U.S. Dep't of Justice, Joint Statement of the Federal Trade
Commission and the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice on Certificate-of-Need
Laws and South Carolina House Bill 3250, at 17 (Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/policy/policy-
actions/advocacy-filings/2016/01/joint-statement-federal-trade-commission-antitrust
[https://perma.cc/22HR-R92Z].
257. See, e.g., Colon Health Centers of Am., LLC v. Hazel, 813 F.3d 145 (4th Cir. 2016).
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B. A Different Type of Laboratory, the States
With federal law allowing disruption and arbitrage and the absence of any
clear legislative or regulatory paths, might state law fulfill its traditional
laboratory role by implementing some stopgap measures? Clearly, states do
operate in this space, although they may not conceptualize their actions as data
protection. Take, for example, the impact of past criminal records on
employment decisions. Federal law, represented by EEOC Guidance, takes the
position that the overrepresentation of persons of color in "contact with the
criminal justice system" could impact some discriminatory hiring or other
employment decisions.259 In contrast, several states have taken a far more direct
approach, enacting "second chance" laws that permit convicted persons to
withhold information about expunged crimes.2 60
In the health-care data protection space, few states have moved far from the
HIPAA norm. Even California's Confidentiality of Medical Information Act,
2 6 1
long held out as the model for regulation that goes beyond HIPAA, does little to
deal with the disruption and arbitrage discussed here. At first sight, the statute's
inclusion of "[a]ny business that offers software or hardware to consumers shall
be deemed to be a provider of health care"2 62 suggests the obvious. However,
additional verbiage and a cross-reference suggest that in reality regulatory
coverage is only extended to some PHRs.
Texas goes further, more successfully increasing the scope of health-care
data protection (albeit still concentrating on downstream models). For example,
the Texas statute uses a far broader definition of "covered entity" than HIPAA to
include a "business associate, health care payer, governmental unit, information
or computer management entity, school, health researcher, health care facility,
clinic, health care provider, or person who maintains an Internet site[.]"
2 63 The
statute also prohibits unconsented to reidentification26 and the sale of PHI.
265
The "laboratory of the states" argument is always attractive during a time of
Congressional logjam. Stakeholders are paying careful attention to forthcoming
state privacy legislation, although for now there is little in the way of health-care
data protection. For example, the Tenth Amendment Center and the ACLU
259. See Consideration ofArrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions Under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/upload/arrestconviction.pdf [https://perma.cc/3B6E-8HEU].
260. See, e.g., Greg Glod, "Second Chance" Legislation is Smart Criminal Justice Reform,
RIGHT ON CRIME (Apr. 10, 2015), http://rightoncrime.com/2015/04/second-chance-legislation-is-
smart-criminal-justice-reform [https://perma.cc/W5ZG-G6HE].
261. CAL. CIV. CODE D. 1, Pt. 2.6 (West 2016).
262. CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.06(b) (West 2016).
263. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 181.001 (a)(2) (West 2015).
264. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 181.151 (West 2015).
265. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 181.153 (West 2015).
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recently participated in the coordinated announcement of various state data
protection measures, primarily aimed at reducing surveillance.2 66
C. What Style ofRegulation is Appropriate for Disruptive Technologies?
Nathan Cortez has offered a thoughtful critique of the conventional wisdom
as to how agencies should regulate disruptive businesses.26 7 His starting point is
Tim Wu's context-based defense of "agency threats," sub-regulatory signals that
include "statements of best practices, interpretative guides, private warning
letters, and press releases" 268 directed at industries facing uncertainty or
disruption.269
Threats are not intended as a permanent solution, but rather as part of a
longer process. If successful and widely respected, it is possible that a threat may
create an industry norm, removing the need for rulemaking at all. Alternatively, a
threat regime may be a pilot, as it were, for eventual lawmaking. The law created
by rulemaking or adjudication will then benefit from the facts developed under
the threat regime.27 0
Cortez's opposing argument is that "agencies need not be so deliberate and
tentative with regulating innovations-even disruptive ones."271 Rather "[t]he
public interest demands that agencies maintain their fortitude in the face of
regulatory disruption. And, somewhat counterintuitively, new technologies can
benefit from decisive, well-timed regulation."27 2 Cortez argues, "[t]he trick is to
craft enduring policy under high uncertainty[,]" suggesting the use of "sunsets"
and "deadlines."27 3
An early sign of regulatory disruption in the mobile health space came with
regard to patient safety when, in 2013, the FDA essentially ceded its regulatory
territory with a sub-regulatory Guidance as to which mobile apps it would choose
to regulate under Section 201(h) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.274
266. Mike Maharrey, 16 States Simultaneously Announce Efforts to Protect Privacy, #TakeCTRL,
TENTH AMEND. CTR. (Jan. 20, 2016), http://tenthamendmentcenter.comi/2016/01/20/16-states-
simultaneously-announce-efforts-to-protect-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/SNZ6-J5MX]; see generally
Andy Greenberg, 5 Things Congress Should Learn From New State Privacy Bills, WIRED (Jan, 21,
2016), http://www.wired.com/2016/01 /five-things-new-state-privacy-bills-could-teach-congress/
[https://perma.cc/G7CE-NX7J]; Hamza Shaban, To Strengthen Consumer Privacy, the ACLULooks
to the States, BuzzFEED NEWS (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.buzzfeed.com/hamzashaban/aclu-takes-
consumer-privacy-battle-to-the-states#.IuojOnXMY [https://perma.cc/78AH-A22W].
267. Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175 (2014).
268. Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L.J. 1841, 1841 (2011).
269. Id. at 1848.
270. Id. at 1851.
271. Cortez, supra note 267, at 227.
272. Id. at 179-80.
273. Id at 217.
274. Mobile Medical Applications: Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug
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Under this Guidance, FDA elected to exercise regulatory discretion over
common health related apps such as trackers.
Rather than solve problems, the guidance seems to have had the opposite
effect, arguably supporting Cortez's arguments. For example, Apple omitted
health-monitoring features such as blood pressure and stress level when it
launched Apple Watch in 2015. It is widely believed that this decision was made,
at least in part, because of regulatory concerns.2 75 Subsequently, Apple CEO Tim
Cook stated:
We don't want to put the watch through the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) process. I wouldn't mind putting something
adjacent to the watch through it, but not the watch, because it would
hold us back from innovating too much, the cycles are too long. But you
can begin to envision other things that might be adjacent to it -- maybe
an app, maybe something else.276
In fact, FDA practice suggests a very light regulatory hand, featuring not
only sub-regulatory guidance, but also under-enforcement. For example, so far
the agency has only reined in one mobile app developer.277
Not surprisingly, developers are selling apps that apparently perform
medical device functions, yet are "saved" from regulation by "small print"
characterizations. For example, take the app "Instant Blood Pressure." Its
developer includes the following in its FAQ:
Instant blood pressure is not a medical device. It is for recreational use
only. It is not a replacement for a medical grade blood pressure monitor.
It is not intended for use in and should not be used for the diagnosis of
disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment or
prevention of disease.278
As a matter of law, this statement is not determinative, as the manufacturer's
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDoc
uments/UCM263366.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FVZ-F6D7] (the Guidance is primarily the same
as that originally issued in September 2013).
275. Daisuke Wakabayashi, What Exactly Is an Apple Watch For?, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 16, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/challenge-of-apple-watch-defining-its-purpose-
1424133615?mod=e2fb [https://perma.cc/3GQL-EMBK].
276. Allister Heath, Apple's Tim Cook Declares the End of the PC and Hints at New Medical
Product, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology
/apple/l 1984806/Apples-Tim-Cook-declares-the-end-of-the-PC-and-hints-at-new-medical-
product.html [https://perma.cc/DJ4Y-6Q4U].
277. Letter from Food & Drug Admin. to Myshkin Ingawale, Biosense Technologies Private
Limited, http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ResourcesforYou/Industry/ucm353513.htm
[https://perma.cc/C9FQ-7N6S].
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intent is objectively determined.279 However, statements like this-and there are
many similar statements included within other apps-at least temporarily allow
for arbitrage as the app is characterized as consumer, rather than professional, in
nature.
Regarding health-care data protection, HHS simply lacks regulatory
authority over most of the mobile health activity. Very few mobile app
developers or service providers will be covered entities or their business
associates. Likely, even a guidance would be viewed as overreaching.28 0 The
furthest HHS-OCR has gone on its own has been to post a lightly-trafficked
Q&A page for health app developers281 and, as mentioned above, worked with
the FTC and the FDA on a web-based interactive tool for app developers.28 2
Under pressure from Congress, HHS (with a little help from the FTC) has made
clear their relative powerless in the emerging mobile health space.
Health information is increasingly collected, shared, or used by new types of
organizations beyond the traditional health care organizations currently covered
by HIPAA, such as peer health communities, online health management ools,
and websites used to generate information for research, any of which might be
accessed on computers or smart phones and other mobile devices. If they are not
determined to be health plans, health care clearinghouses, or health care
providers conducting certain electronic transactions, and they are not acting on
behalf of, or providing a service to, a HIPAA covered entity, they are not subject
to the HIPAA standards for covered entities and business associates.283
Specifically, HHS's analysis pointed to five classes of data protection
responsibilities in which non-covered entities faced lower data protection duties
than HIPAA covered entities: access rights, third-party data use, security
standards, required privacy notices, and disclosure limitations.2 84
The FDA has gingerly entered the data protection space with a series of sub-
regulatory guidances on device security.285 In a recent draft guidance, FDA
279. 21 C.F.R. § 801.4 (2016).
280. Consider the stakeholder concerns about ONC overstepping its authority in the 2016
NPRM on EHR certification. See Rajiv Leventhal, ONC's New Leader Defends Agency's Role in
EHR Oversight, HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS (Sept. 20, 2016), http://www.healthcare-
informatics.com/article/ehr/onc-s-new-leader-defends-agency-s-role-ehr-oversight
[https://perma.cc/D2Q4-S4Y2].
281. Health App Developers: Questions About HIPAA?, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://hipaaqsportal.hhs.gov/a/home [https://perma.cc/7UJKQ-VHQQ].
282. Mobile Health Apps Interactive Tool, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/business-center/guidance/mobile-health-apps-interactive-tool [https://perma.cc/D9HK-
E73S].
283. Health Data Collected by Entities Not Regulated by HIPAA, supra note 205, at 4.
284. Id at 20-30.
285. Guidance for Industry and FDA Staff Guidance for the Content of Premarket Submissions
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"emphasize[d] that manufacturers should monitor, identify and address
cybersecurity vulnerabilities and exploits as part of their postmarket management
of medical devices."286 Presumably, however, even this guidance would not
apply to mobile medical apps that are currently excluded from device regulation
under the 2015 Guidance.2 87
In 2013, the FTC published a lower-level, sub-regulatory "guide," Marketing
Your Mobile App: Get It Right from the Start, that urged transparency,
truthfulness, consent, and data minimization:
Under the law, you still have to take reasonable steps to keep sensitive
data secure. One way to make that task easier: If you don't have a
specific need for the information, don't collect it in the first place. The
wisest policy is to:
1. collect only the data you need;
2. secure the data you keep by taking reasonable precautions against
well-known security risks;
3. limit access to a need-to-know basis; and
4. safely dispose of data you no longer need.288
Notwithstanding its lowly status, the agency has undoubtedly heightened the
agency threat status of this "guide" through their subsequent agency enforcement
activities with regard to security289 and privacy.290 Indeed, the FTC's track record
in security cases warranted the publication of yet another guide in 2015, Start
ucm089593.pdf [https://perma.cc/8XW7-65J9]; Guidance to Industry: Cybersecurity for Networked
Medical Devices Containing Off-the-Shelf (OTS) Software, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., (Jan. 2005),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/
ucm077823.pdf [https://perma.cc/N278-M3QK].
286. Draft Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff Postmarket
Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 4 (Jan. 2016),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocumen
ts/UCM482022.pdf [https://perma.cc/J382-SBP7].
287. See supra text accompanying note 274.
288. Marketing Your Mobile App: Get It Right from the Start, FED. TRADE COMMISSION 5 (Apr.
2013), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf-0140 marketing-your-
mobile-app.pdf [https://perma.cc/WEM8-24WY].
289. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., No. 14-3514 (3rd Cir. filed
Aug. 24, 2015), http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/1
43 5 14p.pdf [https://perma.cc/A89H-
VN29]; see also Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Fandango, Credit Karma Settle FTC Charges
That They Deceived Consumers by Failing to Securely Transmit Sensitive Personal Information
(Mar. 28, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/
2 014/03/fandango-credit-karma-
settle-ftc-charges-they-deceived-consumers [https://perma.cc/5RL2-XFKX].
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with Security, A Guide for Business that is subtitled Lessons Learned from FTC
Cases.291
In 2016 The FTC began hosting a "Mobile Health Apps Interactive Tool"
jointly produced with HHS, ONC, and FDA designed to "give [mobile app
developers] a snapshot of a few important laws and regulations from three federal
agencies."2 92 The FTC also has continued in its somewhat lonely role of curbing
the worst excesses of big data. Recently it followed up on its 2014 Data Brokers
report293 with another report, Big Data: A Tool for Inclusion or Exclusion?29 4
While the former was investigatory, the latter is a clear agency "threat," as the
agency notes its specific (e.g., FCRA) and general (§5(a)) powers to police big
data.
D. The Level ofRegulation: The Case for Continued Exceptionalism
There seem to be few arguments that health-care data are not sensitive and
deserving of protection. The real question in today's environment, is whether
health privacy advocates should throw in their lot with those arguing for
heightened protection across all domains. This section asks whether continuing
calls for health data protection exceptionalism have any particular salience.
Several claims seem to have merit.
First, from earliest times the physician-patient-data relationship has involved
special data obligations. A patient holds health information (either literally or as
data that can be released during diagnosis). The patient's rights over this data are
protected by both ethical and legal principles; an autonomy model requiring
consent to data sharing.295 Thus, in both the legal and ethical senses, the patient
(instrumentally) exercises this right of privacy when the patient gives a physician
access to these data. In exchange for that consent the physician agrees to hold the
data in confidence, an obligation sourced in ethical frameworks, the confidence
tort, and ethical-legal hybrids such as the duty owed by fiduciaries.296 In the
291. Start with Security: A Guide for Business, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (June 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf0205-startwithsecurity.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V3MG-V97W].
292. Mobile Health Apps Interactive Tool, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/business-center/guidance/mobile-health-apps-interactive-tool [https://perma.cc/S26G-T68P].
293. Data Brokers, supra note 3.
294. Big Data Report, supra note 249.
295. "The primary justification seems closer to respect for autonomy... We owe respect in the
sense of deference to persons' autonomous wishes not to be observed, touched, intruded on, and the
like. The right to authorize or decline access is basic." BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 36, at
313-14.
296. See generally Nicolas P. Terry, What's Wrong with Health Privacy?, 5 J. HEALTH &
BIOMEDICAL L. 1, 1-32 (2009); see also SANDRA PETRONIO, BOUNDARIES OF PRIVACY: DIALECTICS
OF DISCLOSURE 28 (2002) (describing operation of "communication privacy management" such that
"when a person confides, the recipient is held responsible for the information and a set of
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words of Bill Gardner:
[H]ealth services data are the residue of the touches of living persons
against the health care system. As such, they reflect the experience of
those patients, even if such effects are often obscure to the analyst. The
data are lit from within by the experience of patients, even if only
faintly. Medical data are the relics of human suffering, recovery, and
death. We wouldn't be looking at them if there wasn't a signal there.
2 97
In the health-care domain, therefore, there is a deep, culturally significant,
and relationship-based demand for the strongest level of data protection. As
noted by the HITPC in 2010, "[t[he relationship between the patient and his or
her healthcare provider is the foundation for trust in health information exchange,
particularly with respect to protecting the confidentiality of personal health
mformation."98
Second, patients have been conditioned to disclose all data to their health-
care providers on the basis of this very promise; that such data will be protected
like no other. This somewhat reductionist argument should not be dismissed
lightly. Patients have grown up with a system that has seemed impervious to even
basic data sharing. Almost every visit to a provider involves filling out a new
intake form or, at least, updating insurance and other personal information. As
had been argued, "[platients should not be surprised about or harmed by
collections, uses, or disclosures of their information."2 99 For the past 15 years
almost every health-care encounter will have been marked by the production of a
HIPAA privacy notice,300 the right to inspect and obtain copies,' and receive an
accounting of disclosures.302 Think of the surprise, the dashed expectations if a
patient was to find that his or her data no longer was exceptionally protected
because of an informational accident as to where they were created (e.g., on a
smartphone) or who was their curator (a data broker).
Third, health-care data deserves exceptional protection in the face of
exceptional threats. Health-care data is a hot commodity on the dark web.
3 03 It is
297. Bill Gardner, Ethics and Data: What's at Stake, INCIDENTAL ECONONIST (Sept. 25, 2015),
http://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/ethics-and-data-whats-at-stake
[https://perma.cc/N68V-ZJU4].
298. Letter from Paul Tang, supra note 126.
299. Id.
300. 45 C.F.R. § 164.520 (2016).
301. 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2016).
302. 45 C.F.R. § 164.528 (2016).
303. See generally Damon Beres, What You Should Know About the 'Dark Web,'An Anonymous
Haven for Hackers, HUFFINGTON PosT (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/what-
is-the-dark-web 55d48c50e4b0ab468d9fl7d7 [https://perma.cc/6XZH-W8UC]; see also Andrea
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the fastest growing target for cyber-attacks,30 accounting for 21% of data
breaches globally.30 5 Data brokers see a strong market for health-based ratings
products. App stores are populated by tens of thousands of health and wellness
apps, often of dubious provenance. Even respectable outcomes and human
subject researchers covet clinical data at a time when the choice architecture for
patient consent has not been agreed upon.
Fourth, health-care data seems particularly susceptible to discriminatory and
other harmful uses. As noted in the 2015 HITPC report, under U.S. law some
"discriminatory uses of health information are either not prohibited or are
expressly permitted (for example, use of health information in life and disability
insurance decisions)."306 The report also acknowledged, "a lack of consensus on
which uses are 'harmful,' particularly with respect to health big data analytics, as
well as an inability to predict which future uses could be harmful and which
beneficial, creating challenges to enacting policies to prohibit or place additional
constraints on such uses."307 The real issue is that the use of health-care data
outside of the clinical setting with the potential for real or perceived harms will
devastate the trust that accompanied the initial patient sharing of data with the
provider. Without trust, patients will share less, and.both their clinical care and
the responsible research that could be performed using those data will suffer.3 08
Finally, while as citizens we may generally view the market as the best
available solution to our problems and support the liquidity of data to foster
innovation, we continue to stake out some limits. Policymakers have spent untold
energy in trying to reverse health care's chronic market failure309 and make it
work more like other "normal" products and services. But in the words of David
Blumenthal, "[p]eople feel differently" about health care "than they do about the
myriad other things that get bought and sold, without controversy, in normal
markets.""o And, as result "[g]overnment is involved in health care because
304. See, e.g., Lucas Mearian, Cyberattacks Will Compromise 1-in-3 Healthcare Records Next
Year, COMPUTERWORLD (Dec 8, 2015), http://www.computerworld.com/article/3013013/healthcare
-it/cyberattacks-will-compromise-1-in-3-healthcare-records-next-year.html [https://perma.cc/6YP7-
PS5Z]; Shannon Pettypiece, Rising Cyber Attacks Costing Health System $6 Billion Annually,
BLOOMBERG (May 7, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-07/rising-cyber-
attacks-costing-health-system-6-billion-annually [https://perma.cc/XV5L-4JZW].
305. 2015 First Half Review, BREACH LEVEL INDEX 10 (Sept. 2015),
http://www.breachlevelindex.com/pdf/Breach-Level-Index-Report-H12015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D73Q-3LVY].
306. Health Big Data Recommendations, upra note 158, at 12.
307. Id. at 12-13.
308. "Failing to pay attention to these issues undermines trust in health big data analytics,
which could create obstacles to leveraging health big data to achieve gains in health and well-
being." Id. at 13.
309. ARROw, supra note 252, at 941-73.
310. David Blumenthal, What's the Big Deal About Drug Prices?, COMMONWEALTH FUND
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Americans deeply desire the health care protections government provides.""' In
short, data protection regarding our health care is important enough to us to
warrant exceptional protection.
VII. MOVING BEYOND HIPAA, EXPLORING THE POTENTIAL OF MULTIPLE DATA
PROTECTION MODELS
Privacy policymakers and champions for regulation have pushed back
against data brokers, accusing them of expropriation312 and encouraging data
determinism.3' In many cases, the same accusations can be made against those
collecting data with mobile apps (particularly those selling the data to big data
brokers). In The Black Box Society, Frank Pasquale described how those data-
gathering and analytic tools might impact health-care data subjects:
[A] "body score" may someday be even more important than your credit
score. Mobile medical apps and social networks offer powerful
opportunities to find support, form communities, and address health
issues. But they also offer unprecedented surveillance of health data,
largely ungoverned by traditional health privacy laws (which focus on
doctors, hospitals, and insurers). Furthermore, they open the door to
frightening and manipulative uses of that data by ranking
intermediaries- data scorers and brokers- and the businesses,
employers, and government agencies they inform.
314
In its 2014 report on data brokers' practices, the FTC noted how health
information or medically-inflected data was used to create "potentially sensitive
categories [that] highlight certain health-related topics or conditions, such as
"Expectant Parent," "Diabetes Interest," and "Cholesterol Focus."
3 15 In Here's
Looking at You, the California HealthCare Foundation noted:
Consumer scores are now ubiquitous across peoples' activities: financial
and credit, energy use, law enforcement, environmental, social clout, tax
returns, environmental "green-ness," and health. In 2014, there were at
least a dozen health scores available in the marketplace, including the
311. Id.
312. Julie Brill, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Keynote Address at the 23rd Computers,
Freedom, and Privacy Conference: Reclaim Your Name 11-12 (June 26, 2013),
http://www.ftc.gov/speechesIbrill1I30626computersfreedom.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4KU-FUN4].
313. Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Keynote Address at the Tech. Pol'y
Inst. Aspen Forum: The Privacy Challenges of Big Data: A View from the Lifeguard's Chair 7
(Aug. 19, 2013), http://ftc.gov/speeches/ramirez/130819bigdataaspen.pdf [https://perma.cc/XS6V-
BAVT].
314. FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK Box SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL
MONEY AND INFORMATION 26 (2015) (references omitted).
315. Data Brokers, supra note 3, at 47.
199
57
Terry: Regulatory Disruption and Arbitrage in Health-Care Data Protectio
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
Affordable Care Act (ACA) Individual Health Risk Score, FICO
Medication Adherence Score, several frailty scores, personal health
scores (e.g., WebMD, One Health Score), and medical complexity
scores (e.g., Aristotle for scoring of surgery for congenital health
conditions). Consumers are largely unaware of the existence and use of
these scores and the algorithms that create them.316
Notwithstanding its flaws, HIPAA was a reasonable approach to health-care
data protection in the last decade of the twentieth century. At the time, both
"privacy" and security threats primarily arose from inside the health-care system.
Data protection required an update from the haphazard nature of state
confidentiality-based protections as the industry swapped PCs for paper, while
hospital IT needed a solid nudge to lock some doors and reduce the number of
stolen laptops and thumb drives. As such, combining a solid, if exclusively
downstreai, national HIPAA floor and compliance-based policing made some
sense.
Fast-forward to 2009, and policymakers seemed unable to look to the future.
The HITECH Act was designed to improve the HIPAA system just enough to
absorb the unprecedented growth of EHRs, which the same legislation was about
to subsidize. 317 The only attempt to think outside the hospital-based technology
box was the introduction of a breach notification rule for PHRs. Yet, the
implications of big data mining and data aggregation were already being
discussed and the iPhone's introduction in 2007,318 followed a year later by its
app store,3 19 suggested the birth of a mobile revolution.
The closing argument of this article is that today the traditional, exceptional,
justifiably high protection of health-care data is seriously threatened by the
disruption and arbitrage displayed in big data and mobile spaces. Waiting in the
wings are other threats from emerging, more autonomous technologies such as
the Internet of Things, self-driving vehicles, and robots.32 0
Because of the threats to health-care data protection, legislation providing
for data minimization and context-based limitations is urgently required.
316. Here's Looking at You: How Personal Health Information Is Being Tracked and Used,
CAL. HEALTH CARE FouND., 8 (July 2014), http://www.chcf.org/-/media
/MIEDIA%2OLIBRARY%2OFiles/PDF/PDF%20H/PDF%20HeresLookingPersonalHealthlnfo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L9TG-Y3XJ].
317. See generally Terry, supra note 108.
318. Press Release, Apple, Inc., Apple Reinvents the Phone with iPhone (Jan. 9, 2007),
https://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/01/09Apple-Reinvents-the-Phone-with-iPhone.html
[https://perma.cc/73ZX-8BA5].
319. Michael Arrington, iPhone App Store Has Launched (Updated), TECHCRUNCH (July
10, 2008), http://techcrunch.com/2008/07/1 0/app-store-launches-upgrade-itunes-now
[https://perma.cc/FS55-W2RS].
320. See, e.g., Drew Simshaw et al., Regulating Healthcare Robots: Maximizing Opportunities
While Minimizing Risks, 22 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3 (2016); Nicolas Terry, Will the Internet of Things
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Consider, for example, some features of the European General Data Protection
Regulation32 1 that maintain or even strengthen existing data protections that have
existed under the EU Data Directive.322 In this scenario, processing of "data
concerning health" is prohibited unless it falls within quite limited exceptions
including diagnosis and some research.3 23 Further, the "purpose limitation"
endures such that "Personal data shall be . . . collected for specified, explicit and
legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible
with those purposes."324 Along with data minimization, the purpose limitation
puts major constraints on big data collection and analytics.
325 The regulation also
restricts the use of "automated processing, including profiling."326
The most appropriate solution would be for Congress to enact a new,
hopefully FIPPS-rich, federal privacy code and/or give rule-making power to the
FTC or some new data protection agency (perhaps a model based on Senator
Elizabeth Warren's Consumer Financial Protection Bureau). Any code or
regulations could apply equally to all data types. Or, as seems more likely, they
could also single out certain sensitive data types such as health data for additional
protection. Whichever route Congress were to adopt, they must apply the correct
approach to any future "sectoral" model of protection. First, agree on the general
protective principles, and only then build out conceptually consistent protections.
Framed in large part, although not exclusively, by the explosion of big data
services, various branches of the federal government published privacy reports
and proposals between 2012 and 2015. All favored increased regulation,
including of data brokers, yet failed to agree on much else.
3 27 Thereafter, and
with implications for mobile health, the FTC recommended broad,
321. Supra, discussion on page 252.
322. See, e.g., Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281/42), § 6 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:31995L0046.
323. Commission Regulation 2016/679, art. 9, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 38.
324. Id. art. 5.
325. See generally Opinion of the Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with regard to
the Processing of Personal Data, Article 29 WP, Opinion 03/2013 on Purpose Limitation,




326. Commission Regulation 2016/679, art. 22, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 46.
327. Framework for Protecting Privacy, supra note 18; Protecting Consumer Privacy, supra
note 40; Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, supra note 77; President's Council of Advisors on Sci.
& Tech., Big Data and Privacy: A Technological Perspective, EXECUTIVE OFFICE PRESIDENT,
(May 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST
/pcast big data andprivacy_-_may_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/QN7C-CMXP];
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technologically-neutral privacy legislation backed up with self-regulatory
programs for the Internet of Things.328
There is no indication that these recommendations have any traction or that
Congress would even consider such sweeping legislation. However, there is the
potential-particularly in the wake of, say, some massive big data breach or
scandal-quality privacy violation-that Congress might consider highly targeted
legislation providing. for explicit consent to health data being shared with data
brokers. In its data brokers report, the FTC urged: "Congress should ... consider
imposing important protections for sensitive information, such as certain health
information, by requiring that consumer-facing sources obtain consumers'
affirmative express consent before collecting and sharing such information with
data brokers."329 Such baseline legislation likely would satisfy Cortez's
"enduring policy" goal while other, more comprehensive proposals are explored
through guidance and codes of conduct.
Another approach would be to extend HIPAA applicability to all custodians
or processors of health-care data. Consider an analogous, superficially attractive,
yet ultimately naive, approach to health-care reform: Medicare for All, achieved
by removing the age eligibility from federal coverage and, creating a single
payer, universal care health-care system.330 Yet, whether judged through
political, constitutional, or organizational lenses, it isn't that simple. As Harold
Pollack notes, "Medicare for All cannot offer itself as the replacement of our
depressing health politics. It would have to arise as another product of that very
same process, passing through the very same legislative choke points,
constrained by the very same path dependencies that bedevil the ACA." 331
Similarly, the answer to whether HIPAA should be broadened with a single
stroke of the pen also must be "no." Such an extension of HIPAA is not rejected
on normative grounds. Health-care data residing outside traditional health-care
space should receive no less protection than that inside it. Indeed, a good
argument can be made that the former deserves more legal protection because
health-care insiders are additionally constrained or policed by professional
standards and ethics thus reducing data subjects' privacy risks. HIPAA's
approach to data protection is exclusively mapped to and calibrated for the
traditional health-care domain. The existential threats to health-care data
protection are from outside of the professional domain and they are not threats
that can be countered only with downstream data protection models. HIPAA was
328. FED. TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 118, at 48-49.
329. Data Brokers, supra note 3, at 52.
330. Nancy Altman, How and Why Medicare for All Is a Realistic Goal, HUFFINGTON PosT
BLOG (Jan. 24, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nancy-altman/how-and-why-medicare-
for_b_9063970.html [https://perma.cc/JD42-C8SA].
331. Harold Pollack, Medicare for All-If It Were Politically Possible-Would Necessarily
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specifically designed to map (whether successfully or not) to professional health-
care workflows and issues. Any fundamental broadening of its scope would be
highly problematic. Most importantly, the data protection problems highlighted
by big data and mobile health suggest that upstream regulatory models are
required, not the types of downstream protections (HIPAA privacy, security and
breach notification) offered by HIPAA.
Given the problems associated with extending HIPAA and absent broad
privacy legislation, what would be most effective in reducing or eliminating
regulatory disruption and arbitrage in health-care data protection? In this
admittedly imperfect world, this article suggests three strategies. First, HHS-
OCR and the FTC should focus particular enforcement attention on the
protection of HIPAA-zone data that are sources for big data. Second, ONC
should use its existing regulatory powers to tighten up some aspects of the
existing HIPAA privacy and security rules. Third, if politics continue to get in
the way of comprehensive federal privacy legislation, Congress should at least
pass narrower provisions aimed at some of the more obvious targets.
A. Increased Enforcement
Particularly with regard to big data brokers, both OCR and FTC need to
remain vigilant and, through rigorous enforcement, pressure brokers to reform
their practices to the benefit of consumers. There is little doubt that some
HIPAA-zone data migrates into big data. Here, strong OCR enforcement of the
existing data protection rules may deter some big data collection. For example,
there should be heightened scrutiny of compliance with the requirements for PHI
de-identification,3 32 particularly with regard to the addressing of the potential for
re-identification under HIPAA's "expert" (or statistical) method.
333 OCR should
also dedicate particular enforcement attention to large caches of human subjects
research data to ensure the highest levels of privacy and security for research
subjects.33 4Additionally, OCR should extend its recent interest
3 regarding the
332. See, supra, text accompanying notes 90-91.
333. See generally How Do Experts Assess the Risk of Identification of Information?, U.S.
DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/special-
topics/de-identification/#idrisk [https://perma.cc/C7VC-TQTZ] (providing risk assessment
information regarding the risk of reidentification of various identifiers).
334. See, e.g., Corrective Action Plan between the United States Department of Health and
Human Services and the Feinstein Institute for Medical Research (Mar. 16, 2016) ($3.9m




335. Corrective Action Plan between the United States Department of Health and Human
Services and Raleigh Orthopaedic Clinic, P.A. (Apr. 14, 2016) ($750,000 settlement),
http://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/Raleigh%200rthopaedic%20RA%
2 0% 2 6% 2 0CAP%2 0
%28508%29_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/NZB5-5TWJ]; North Memorial Health Care Resolution
Agreement and Corrective Action Plan, ($1.55m settlement),
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formation of business associate agreements (BAAs)336 to scrutinizing the
contemplated use of PHI in BAAs.3 37 Meanwhile, the FTC should continue to
address point-of-use discriminatory and other unfair practices with both its
general powers under the FTC Act and its specific authority under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act and other equal opportunity laws, as it promised in its Tool for
Inclusion or Exclusion report.338
B. Amendments to the Privacy and Security Rules
Business Associates aside, ONC lacks authority to regulate data custodians
who are not covered entities.339 Notwithstanding this limitation, the agency could
tighten up the protection of PHI or data that has been protected as PHI. As a
result, the HIPAA Privacy Rule should be amended to require:
Any de-identified data derived from patient clinical information should be
subject to a data use agreement prohibiting re-identification.
The Security Rule should be amended to require:
PHI data must be encrypted both in motion and at rest.
These amendments would lessen the risk of unlawful "exports" of PHI. They
would also require mobile apps produced by covered entities or their business
associates to adopt high levels of data protection for consumer-facing apps that
collect, process, or transfer PHI.34
C. Targeted Federal Legislation
As already noted the probability for even targeted federal legislation being
considered by Congress is low. However, political bodies are reactive and if there
http://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/North%20Memorial%20RA%20and%20CAP%20March
%202016%20%28508%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/85XQ-CN44].
336. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103; 164.502(e), 164.504(e) (2016).
337. On a side note, providers should ensure that the BAAs they sign with big data providers do
not allow data generated within the HIPAA zone to be exported for purposes not related to
permitted uses. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2016). On concerns about leakage from health-care systems
as a result of such agreements, see Subhajit Basu, Should the NHS share patient data with
Google's DeepMind? WIRED UK (May 16, 2016), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/nhs-deepmind-
google-data-sharing [https://perma.cc/9BTE-CP4Q]; Ben Quinn, Google Given Access to
Healthcare Data of Up to 1.6 Million Patients, GUARDIAN (May 4, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2 01 6/may/04/google-deepmind-access-healthcare-
data-patients [https://perma.cc/E9YE-88DK].
338. Big Data Report, supra note 249.
339. See, supra, text accompanying note 85 et seq.
340. Non-HIPAA regulated apps would be subject to FTC ex post facto regulation if encryption
was, for example, claimed but not implemented. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Fandango,
Credit Karma Settle FTC Charges that They Deceived Consumers by Failing to Securely Transmit
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was to be some major breach or some other high profile abuse of health
information in the mobile or big data space there might be the opportunity for
targeted legislation.
Any such legislation would face a threshold, definitional issue. Data
protected by HIPAA is defined both by data type (PHI) and by custodian type
(covered entity). Exceptional treatment of health data will require a new
definition that is custodian-agnostic. The EU GDPR contains a usable definition:
'data concerning health' means personal data related to the physical or mental
health of a natural person, including the provision of health care services, which
reveal information about his or her health status."34' Examples of limited,
targeted legislation include the following:
Any "data concerning health" collected by non-HIPAA covered entities
must only be used for the limited purpose for which it was collected.
Consumer-facing sources must obtain consumers' affirmative express
consent before collecting and sharing "data concerning health" with data
brokers.342
Point-of-use prohibitions for discriminatory uses of "data concerning health"
must be expanded.
Data custodians are prohibited from re-identifying or attempting to re-
identify any individual who was the subject of protected health information that
has been de-identified.343
All custodians of "data concerning health" must provide access to the data
upon request from any identified or identifiable data subject and implement
systems enabling correction or deletion of such data.
As is evident, these suggested reforms (even if all were passed into
legislation) fall well-short of any more utopian calls for comprehensive data
protection legislation. However, each proposal is true to the spirit of FIPPS and,
even if adopted singly, each would reduce the current disruption and arbitrage in
health care data protection.
CONCLUSION
At the root of the arguments advanced in this article is one unassailable fact:
vast quantities of health-care data are now being exported to, or created outside
of, HIPAA-protected spaces. The upshot is a dramatically uneven policy
environment. The holders of vast amounts of health-care-like data increasingly
benefit from low or no data protection. Existing "protections" are being applied
to similar data not on the basis of any rational distinctions, but on the basis of an
341. Commission Regulation 2016/679, art. 4(15), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 34.
342. The FTC proposal from 2014, discussed supra note 329.
343. Based on the Texas provision, discussed supra notes 263-265.
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accident of creation or current, possibly transient, states. Health-care
professionals, patients, pre-patients, and responsible data processors all suffer
mightily from this uneven policy environment.
There is little doubt that increasingly our "medical selves" will exist outside
of the traditional, HIPAA-regulated health-care domain. As regulatory disruption
and arbitrage increase, this will create progressively exploitable confusion as
health information moves in and out of differentially protected domains. There is
now massive commercial value to be extracted from health-care data, leading
data aggregators and processors to perform an end-run around health care's
domain-specific protections by creating medical profiles (HIPAA proxies) of
individuals in HIPAA-free space. This will only increase as the possibilities of
the Internet of Things, robotics, autonomous vehicles, and technologies not yet
imagined interact with our medical selves.
Unfortunately, as Fleischer recognized, "[i]n the [last] twenty-five years ...
the administrative state has increased substantially, and the amount of time
lawyers devote to regulatory matters has grown apace."3" As a result, "[t]he
complexity of the modem administrative state provides more opportunities for
regulatory arbitrage--another form of value creation for the client--than ever
before."345 Further, as Brad Smith, Microsoft's Chief Legal Officer, recently
noted in the context of the collapse of U.S.-EU safe harbor, "privacy rights
cannot endure if they change every time the data moves from one location to
another. Individuals should not lose their fundamental rights simply because their
personal information crosses a border."346 Or, in this case, move from a hospital
EHR to an iPhone.
Some policymakers now recognize (albeit belatedly) that the protection of
health-care data is diminished when it is created in or migrates to the HIPAA-
free zone; a place of considerably reduced, even zero data protection. There has
also been some recognition that this new state results in regulatory turbulence,
disruption, and, at least in the case of big data, regulatory arbitrage. It is less clear
whether policymakers recognize the multi-faceted nature of the problem.
Although a downstream, compliance-based data protection model such as
HIPAA can deal with a relatively cohesive domain, it is ill-prepared for the
variety of challenges that occur when data are created outside of the that domain.
As a result, merely extending the domain protection is unlikely to work well.
Further, the dangers associated with a HIPAA-free zone are not limited to
disruption because of uneven data protection domains, but are exacerbated by the
344. Fleischer, supra note 64, at 237.
345. Id.
346. Brad Smith, The Collapse of the US-EU Safe Harbor: Solving the New Privacy Rubik's
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chronic weaknesses of the non-HIPAA data protection models.
In 2009, the HITECH Act instructed HHS and FTC to "conduct a study, and
submit a report ... on privacy and security requirements for entities that are not
covered entities or business associates."347 This was to be followed by the HHS
Secretary reporting to Congress on "the findings of the study . . . includ[ing] in
such report recommendations on the privacy and security requirements described
in such paragraph."3 48 ONC's 2016 "Examining Oversight" purports to be that
report,3 49 even though HHS officials described it as "the first step in a
conversation,"350 and it failed to discuss big data and other existential threats to
health-care privacy, or present meaningful recommendations. Yet the need for
granular, workable proposals for legislation, particularly FIPPS-infused upstream
protections, has never been greater.
In the meantime, the exceptional protection of health data is being
depreciated. There are many reasons and forces conspiring to make this happen.
Some are decisions that go back to the U.S. "original sin" of eschewing a
comprehensive privacy law of general applicability. Some are instrumental,
including the competing forces for data, be they commercial big-data brokers or
the National Institutes of Health. Some are historical, such as the traditional ways
U.S. data protection has been structured-sectoral and downstream,
characteristics that tend to create regulatory turbulence, even arbitrage. Some are
technological, as we come to terms with new generations of personal connected
devices and the vast power of cloud-based data storage and analysis. Whether at
root, this is an issue of health-care-privacy exceptionalism or of the general
inadequacy of data protection in the United States is somewhat moot. Whatever
the causes, exceptional health data protection must be preserved and protected by
increased enforcement and new regulation designed to not only curtail
contemporary regulatory disruption and arbitrage, but also to proactively address
the inevitable technologically-enabled threats that will follow.
347. HITECH Act § 13424(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 17953 (2012).
348. HITECH Act § 13424(b)(2).
349. Health Data Collected by Entities Not Regulated by HIPAA, supra note 205, at 1 n.4.
350. Karen B. DeSalvo & Jocelyn Samuels, Examining Oversight of the Privacy & Security of
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